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  This	  thesis	  reviews	  New	  York	  State’s	  recently	  announced	  subsidization	  of	  nuclear	  energy,	  which	  has	  been	  a	  subject	  of	  dissent	  due	  to	  its	  cost,	  propagation	  of	  nuclear	  activity,	  and	  potential	  unlawfulness	  in	  its	  influence	  on	  competition	  within	  wholesale	  energy	  markets.	  Examining	  the	  structure	  and	  recent	  trends	  within	  New	  York’s	  energy	  market	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  state’s	  nuclear	  energy	  industry	  will	  provide	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  generation.	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  carbon	  emissions,	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  true	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  of	  this	  legislation	  and	  New	  York’s	  motivations	  behind	  its	  implementation	  can	  be	  realized.	  Additionally,	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  exploration	  of	  the	  subsidy’s	  regulatory	  framework	  and	  the	  findings	  of	  applicable	  court	  cases	  will	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  legal	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  legislation,	  allowing	  for	  an	  analysis	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  legality	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  potential	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Introduction	  	  	   In	  the	  United	  States,	  nuclear	  technology	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  ongoing	  debate	  relating	  to	  its	  utilization	  as	  an	  electricity	  generating	  resource.	  In	  recent	  years,	  increased	  concerns	  over	  energy	  security	  and	  climate	  change	  have	  caused	  many	  people	  to	  reconsider	  the	  merits	  and	  drawbacks	  of	  further	  involving	  nuclear	  generation	  in	  the	  energy	  mix.	  As	  these	  issues	  become	  increasingly	  prominent	  in	  energy	  policies	  at	  both	  national	  and	  state	  levels,	  the	  debate	  over	  nuclear	  energy	  has	  intensified	  as	  policymakers	  struggle	  to	  determine	  where	  the	  resource	  should	  fit	  in	  our	  rapidly	  transforming	  energy	  landscape.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  2016,	  New	  York	  State	  addressed	  these	  issues	  through	  passing	  the	  Clean	  Energy	  Standard.	  This	  order	  mandates	  aggressive	  reductions	  in	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  from	  electricity	  generating	  resources	  and	  controversially	  subsidizes	  nuclear	  energy	  by	  requiring	  all	  generators	  to	  purchase	  “zero	  emission	  credits”	  from	  nuclear	  generators,	  citing	  them	  as	  necessary	  to	  meeting	  future	  energy	  and	  emissions	  demands.	  By	  providing	  a	  detailed	  evaluation	  of	  its	  causes	  and	  effects,	  this	  paper	  will	  assess	  the	  appropriateness	  and	  justifiability	  of	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  energy	  subsidization.	  In	  addition,	  it	  will	  describe	  the	  performance	  and	  regulatory	  treatment	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  on	  the	  federal,	  state,	  and	  international	  levels	  to	  place	  this	  statute	  into	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  policy.	  Furthermore,	  investigation	  into	  the	  legal	  dissent	  surrounding	  the	  subsidization	  will	  determine	  if	  the	  actions	  of	  New	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
2	  
York	  State	  set	  a	  precedent	  for	  other	  states	  to	  preserve	  and	  promote	  nuclear	  energy	  resources	  and	  general	  emissions	  reduction	  strategies.	  Ultimately,	  examining	  such	  topics	  will	  draw	  out	  the	  strengths	  and	  shortfalls	  of	  the	  order,	  as	  well	  as	  highlight	  its	  larger	  significance	  to	  energy	  policy	  and	  the	  nuclear	  energy	  industry	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  The	  following	  chapter	  serves	  to	  outline	  the	  goals,	  statutes,	  and	  working	  parts	  of	  New	  York	  State’s	  newly	  enacted	  Clean	  Energy	  Standard	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  Reforming	  the	  Energy	  Vision	  initiative	  that	  it	  is	  a	  component	  of.	  The	  Clean	  Energy	  Standard	  stands	  to	  heavily	  impact	  the	  state’s	  nuclear	  energy	  generation	  industry,	  and	  clarifying	  each	  of	  its	  components	  will	  help	  to	  illustrate	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  the	  regulation	  will	  do	  so.	  To	  place	  New	  York	  State’s	  treatment	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  a	  broader	  context,	  this	  chapter	  will	  recount	  the	  history	  of	  federal	  regulation	  and	  market	  performance	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  examples	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  policies	  in	  individual	  states	  and	  other	  nations.	  This	  will	  place	  New	  York’s	  Clean	  Energy	  Standard	  within	  the	  wider	  regulatory	  and	  market	  landscape	  in	  which	  it	  stands	  and	  will	  serve	  to	  both	  highlight	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  legislation	  and	  explain	  the	  basis	  of	  controversy	  behind	  its	  treatment	  of	  nuclear	  energy.	  	  The	  third	  chapter	  will	  serve	  to	  explain	  the	  basis	  of	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  subsidization	  by	  discussing	  current	  trends	  in	  the	  state’s	  energy	  market	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  the	  nuclear	  industry.	  This	  discussion	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  energy	  market	  structure	  to	  help	  explain	  how	  these	  trends	  are	  altering	  the	  state’s	  energy	  market.	  Additionally,	  it	  will	  explore	  how	  the	  subsidization	  of	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	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facilities	  stands	  to	  impact	  the	  state,	  utilizing	  projections	  of	  how	  their	  closure	  would	  have	  on	  its	  economy,	  emissions	  targets,	  and	  energy	  system.	  Such	  analysis	  will	  reveal	  the	  reasoning	  and	  merit	  behind	  New	  York’s	  subsidy	  program.	  This	  chapter	  will	  also	  give	  a	  detailed	  review	  of	  the	  framework	  by	  which	  subsidy	  prices	  are	  set	  in	  order	  to	  show	  how	  the	  program	  stands	  to	  financially	  impact	  nuclear	  facilities.	  	  	  Chapter	  four	  will	  discuss	  the	  ongoing	  legal	  dissent	  surrounding	  the	  subsidy	  program,	  paying	  particular	  attention	  to	  its	  legality	  in	  respect	  to	  state	  and	  federal	  jurisdiction	  over	  energy	  markets.	  This	  discussion	  will	  include	  an	  examination	  of	  a	  prior	  court	  case	  concerning	  this	  matter	  to	  explain	  the	  legal	  context	  of	  this	  dissent	  and	  how	  it	  will	  influence	  its	  outcome.	  With	  this	  context	  in	  mind,	  this	  chapter	  will	  provide	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  New	  York’s	  actions	  and	  its	  potential	  implications	  for	  future	  state-­‐‑level	  energy	  policies.	  In	  addition,	  it	  will	  examine	  how	  New	  York’s	  program	  has	  already	  begun	  to	  influence	  other	  states	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  protect	  their	  nuclear	  assets	  amid	  changing	  energy	  market	  conditions.	  	  	  
	   	  




The	  Clean	  Energy	  Standard	  and	  Wider	  State	  of	  Nuclear	  
Affairs	  
	  
2.1	  Summary	  	   This	  following	  chapter	  will	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  New	  York’s	  various	  initiatives	  and	  statues	  that	  have	  formed	  and	  later	  mandated	  statewide	  goals	  in	  emissions	  reductions.	  This	  will	  show	  how	  the	  subsidization	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  is	  incorporated	  into	  such	  regulation,	  and	  explain	  what	  entities	  and	  rules	  are	  involved	  in	  such	  a	  program.	  Additionally,	  this	  chapter	  will	  seek	  to	  place	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  subsidization	  in	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  policy.	  This	  discussion	  will	  include	  a	  historical	  recount	  of	  federal	  policy	  and	  market	  performance	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  overview	  of	  current	  state	  regulations	  and	  overall	  stances	  on	  nuclear	  energy.	  To	  display	  how	  treatment	  and	  utilization	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  fits	  within	  the	  wider	  international	  community,	  the	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  by	  exploring	  foreign	  nations	  that	  are	  major	  generators	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  namely	  France,	  China,	  and	  Russia,	  and	  how	  their	  actions	  and	  experiences	  can	  inform	  American	  energy	  policy.	  
2.2	  New	  York	  State’s	  Reforming	  the	  Energy	  Vision	  &	  Clean	  Energy	  
Standard	  On	  April	  24,	  2014,	  Governor	  Andrew	  Cuomo	  announced	  plans	  for	  an	  energy	  modernization	  initiative	  to	  restructure	  energy	  markets	  and	  fundamentally	  shift	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utility	  regulation	  in	  the	  state	  of	  New	  York	  (NYDPS,	  2016).	  Dubbed	  Reforming	  the	  Energy	  Vision	  (REV),	  this	  comprehensive	  initiative	  aims	  to	  align	  the	  market	  and	  regulatory	  landscape	  with	  a	  set	  of	  New	  York	  state	  policy	  objectives,	  including	  increasing	  ratepayer	  knowledge	  of	  demand-­‐‑side	  energy	  management,	  market	  animation	  and	  leverage	  of	  ratepayer	  contributions,	  fuel	  and	  resource	  diversity,	  and	  system-­‐‑wide	  efficiency,	  reliability,	  and	  resilience.	  In	  addition,	  REV	  aims	  to	  modernize	  the	  power	  grid	  to	  take	  full	  advantage	  of	  advances	  in	  clean	  energy	  and	  energy	  efficiency	  technologies	  and	  to	  transform	  the	  market	  to	  allow	  these	  technologies	  to	  flourish.	  This	  effort	  is	  highlighted	  by	  REV’s	  State	  Energy	  Plan	  (SEP),	  which	  sets	  bold	  targets	  of	  a	  statewide	  forty	  percent	  reduction	  in	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  from	  1990	  levels	  by	  2030	  and	  an	  eighty	  percent	  reduction	  by	  2050.	  In	  addition,	  it	  calls	  for	  fifty	  percent	  of	  energy	  consumed	  in	  New	  York	  State	  to	  come	  from	  renewable	  resources	  and	  for	  a	  twenty-­‐‑three	  percent	  reduction	  in	  energy	  consumption	  in	  buildings,	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  six	  hundred	  trillion	  British	  thermal	  units	  in	  energy	  efficiency	  gains,	  by	  2030.	  The	  aggressive	  transformative	  goals	  of	  REV	  have	  made	  New	  York	  a	  national	  leader	  in	  state	  energy	  reform,	  and	  if	  successfully	  implemented	  could	  radically	  alter	  the	  way	  in	  which	  energy	  is	  viewed	  both	  within	  and	  well	  beyond	  state	  borders.	  The	  strikingly	  lofty	  goals	  of	  REV	  were	  given	  legs	  to	  stand	  on	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Order	  Adopting	  a	  Clean	  Energy	  Standard	  (CES).	  Under	  instruction	  from	  Governor	  Cuomo	  and	  the	  New	  York	  Public	  Service	  Commission	  (NYPSC)	  to	  convert	  the	  SEP	  targets	  into	  mandated	  requirements,	  the	  New	  York	  Department	  of	  Public	  Service	  (NYDPS)	  developed	  a	  white	  paper	  on	  CES	  and	  issued	  it	  in	  January	  2016	  for	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consideration	  at	  the	  NYPSC	  session	  in	  June	  2016.	  With	  its	  adoption	  on	  August	  1,	  2016,	  the	  CES	  works	  toward	  the	  policy	  objectives	  of	  increasing	  the	  supply	  of	  renewable	  electricity,	  supporting	  the	  construction	  of	  in-­‐‑state	  renewable	  generation	  facilities,	  preventing	  premature	  closure	  of	  upstate	  nuclear	  facilities,	  and	  promoting	  the	  progress	  of	  REV	  market	  objectives.	  Additionally,	  the	  CES	  establishes	  a	  Renewable	  Energy	  Standard	  (RES),	  which	  mandates	  the	  prior	  SEP	  goal	  of	  reaching	  fifty	  percent	  of	  New	  York’s	  electric	  load	  to	  be	  generated	  by	  renewable	  sources	  by	  2030,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  “50	  by	  30”	  goal.	  Along	  with	  mandating	  “50	  by	  30”,	  the	  CES	  outlines	  the	  way	  that	  New	  York	  State	  will	  achieve	  the	  goal,	  which	  will	  be	  done	  through	  the	  implementation	  of	  annual	  renewable	  targets	  for	  each	  load-­‐‑serving	  entity	  (LSE)	  operating	  within	  the	  state.	  	  	  
2.2.1	  Load-­‐‑Serving	  Entities	  Before	  going	  into	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  annual	  renewable	  targets,	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  to	  first	  provide	  a	  definition	  of	  LSEs,	  as	  they	  are	  the	  organizations	  being	  charged	  with	  reaching	  these	  targets.	  Under	  the	  CES	  Order,	  LSEs	  are	  defined	  as	  “all	  entities	  serving	  retail	  load	  within	  a	  regulated	  utility	  territory…	  This	  includes	  investor-­‐‑owned	  distribution	  utilities,	  energy	  service	  companies	  (ESCO),	  Community	  Choice	  Aggregation	  programs	  (CCA)	  not	  served	  by	  ESCOs,	  and	  jurisdictional	  municipal	  utilities.	  Retail	  customers	  self-­‐‑supplying	  through	  the	  New	  York	  Independent	  System	  Operator	  will	  also	  be	  considered	  LSEs	  for	  this	  purpose”	  (NYPSC,	  2016).	  Utilities	  are	  entities	  that	  have	  the	  responsibility	  of	  providing	  essential	  public	  services,	  such	  as	  electricity,	  natural	  gas,	  and	  water,	  along	  with	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necessary	  infrastructure	  needed	  to	  provide	  those	  commodities.	  An	  ESCO	  is	  a	  commercial	  or	  non-­‐‑profit	  business	  that	  provides	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  energy	  solutions	  related	  to	  increased	  efficiency	  and	  conservation	  of	  energy.	  A	  CCA	  is	  a	  system	  that	  allows	  cities	  and	  counties	  to	  pool	  their	  electricity	  load	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  alternative	  energy	  supply	  contracts	  or	  develop	  power	  on	  their	  own	  behalf,	  and	  are	  only	  found	  in	  a	  handful	  of	  states	  including	  New	  York.	  	  	  	  
2.2.2	  Renewable	  Energy	  Credits	  and	  Zero	  Emission	  Credits	  	   Through	  the	  RES,	  renewable	  targets	  will	  be	  met	  by	  requiring	  LSEs	  to	  procure	  a	  minimum	  percentage	  of	  their	  total	  load	  served	  in	  a	  calendar	  year	  from	  renewable	  energy	  resources.	  These	  minimum	  percentages	  are	  specified	  for	  the	  years	  2017	  through	  2021	  (0.6%,	  1.1%,	  2.0%,	  3.4%,	  4.8%),	  and	  are	  to	  be	  incrementally	  adopted	  from	  2022	  to	  2030.	  The	  procurement	  of	  load	  from	  qualifying	  renewable	  resources	  will	  be	  evidenced	  by	  acquiring	  Renewable	  Energy	  Credits	  (REC).	  A	  REC	  represents	  and	  is	  created	  for	  each	  renewable	  MWh	  generated,	  and	  may	  be	  purchased	  by	  an	  LSE	  to	  demonstrate	  compliance	  at	  the	  price	  of	  $21.16	  per	  MWh.	  An	  LSE	  that	  fails	  to	  procure	  its	  obliged	  portion	  of	  RECs	  will	  be	  charged	  with	  an	  Alternative	  Compliance	  Payment	  (ACP),	  which	  will	  be	  equal	  to	  the	  published	  cost	  of	  an	  REC	  plus	  ten	  percent.	  	  Along	  with	  RECs,	  the	  CES	  establishes	  Zero	  Emission	  Credits	  (ZEC),	  which,	  like	  RECs,	  must	  be	  procured	  in	  a	  minimum	  percentage	  of	  total	  load	  served	  annually	  by	  each	  LSE.	  Also	  similar	  to	  RECs,	  a	  ZEC	  is	  created	  for	  each	  MWh	  of	  nuclear	  electricity	  generated.	  The	  initial	  price	  of	  ZECs	  was	  set	  at	  $17.48	  per	  MWh	  for	  the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  the	  program,	  and	  will	  be	  readjusted	  every	  two-­‐‑year	  period	  during	  its	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duration.	  While	  RECs	  are	  mandated	  for	  the	  ultimate	  purpose	  of	  reaching	  the	  SEP’s	  renewable	  energy	  targets,	  ZECs	  are	  meant	  to	  support	  the	  SEP’s	  aggressive	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  reduction	  goals	  by	  serving	  the	  dual	  purpose	  of	  awarding	  existing	  nuclear	  facilities	  for	  their	  zero	  emission	  attributes	  and	  monetarily	  assisting	  these	  facilities,	  which	  have	  been	  struggling	  recently	  due	  to	  historically	  low	  energy	  prices.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  six	  nuclear	  power	  facilities	  in	  New	  York	  State	  provide	  31.6%	  of	  the	  state’s	  electric	  generation	  and	  produce	  zero	  emission,	  base	  load	  electricity,	  the	  state’s	  nuclear	  generation	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  vital	  resource	  to	  reaching	  the	  SEP	  emission	  goals	  (Figure	  1).	  Overall,	  the	  mandates	  installed	  by	  the	  CES	  make	  the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  SEP	  a	  calculable	  possibility,	  and	  is	  a	  linchpin	  of	  the	  REV	  initiative	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  New	  York	  State	  Energy	  Research	  and	  Development	  Authority	  (NYSERDA)	  will	  act	  as	  the	  central	  administrative	  entity	  for	  RECs	  and	  ZECs,	  making	  it	  responsible	  for	  the	  valuation,	  procurement,	  and	  monitoring	  of	  credits.	  The	  specific	  pricing	  methodology	  behind	  ZECs,	  and	  their	  wider	  impact	  on	  nuclear	  facilities,	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  To	  track,	  verify,	  and	  transfer	  ownership	  of	  credits	  to	  LSEs,	  NYSERDA	  will	  use	  the	  New	  York	  Generation	  Attribute	  Tracking	  System,	  or	  NYGATS,	  which	  is	  an	  online	  system	  that	  manages	  credit	  sales	  and	  trading.	  	  	  Figure	  1:	  New	  York	  Electricity	  Generation	  Fuel	  Mix,	  2014	  
Source	   Percentage	  Natural	  Gas	   39.6	  Nuclear	   31.6	  Hydroelectric	   18.4	  Renewable	  &	  Other	   5.5	  Coal	   3.4	  Oil	   1.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2014	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2.3	  A	  History	  of	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Market	  Performance	  and	  Federal	  Policy	  
in	  the	  United	  States	  	  
	   Nuclear	  energy	  has	  seen	  sporadic	  fits	  of	  federal	  support	  and	  development	  since	  its	  genesis	  (Figures	  2	  &	  3).	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  Manhattan	  Project,	  the	  rapid	  technological	  advancement	  of	  nuclear	  technology	  under	  the	  United	  States	  government	  brought	  to	  light	  the	  considerable	  potential	  for	  nuclear	  power	  to	  generate	  electricity.	  Hoping	  to	  explore	  this	  opportunity	  and	  stay	  ahead	  of	  other	  nations	  in	  nuclear	  capability,	  Congress	  quickly	  passed	  the	  Atomic	  Energy	  Act	  of	  1946.	  This	  act	  placed	  the	  national	  nuclear	  energy	  program	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  United	  States	  military	  and	  established	  the	  Atomic	  Energy	  Commission	  to	  oversee	  the	  development	  of	  nuclear	  science	  and	  technology.	  Less	  than	  a	  decade	  later,	  this	  act	  was	  amended	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Atomic	  Energy	  Act	  of	  1954.	  This	  act	  allowed	  for	  increased	  involvement	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  nuclear	  energy	  production	  by	  allowing	  for	  the	  dissemination	  of	  previously	  classified	  information	  on	  nuclear	  technology	  to	  private	  entities.	  It	  also	  legalized	  private	  investment	  in	  	  
Figure	  2:	  U.S.	  Nuclear	  Electricity	  Generation,	  1971	  –	  2015	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Figure	  3:	  U.S.	  Electricity	  Generation	  Fuel	  Share	  of	  Nuclear	  Energy,	  1957	  –	  2015	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   However,	  the	  Great	  Band	  Wagon	  Market	  slowed	  down	  considerably	  in	  the	  1970s	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  Most	  notably	  was	  the	  infamous	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  accident	  in	  1979,	  which	  caused	  many	  to	  be	  skeptical	  of	  the	  safety	  and	  stability	  of	  nuclear	  technology.	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  accident	  was	  particularly	  unfortunate	  for	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  as	  it	  came	  shortly	  after	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement,	  which	  was	  highlighted	  by	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  National	  Environmental	  Policy	  Act	  in	  1969	  and	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA)	  in	  1970.	  The	  actual	  real	  damage	  caused	  by	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  was	  economic,	  due	  to	  astronomical	  cleanup	  and	  decommissioning	  costs	  and	  the	  subsequent	  loss	  of	  revenue	  and	  jobs.	  Despite	  the	  negligible	  dose	  of	  radiation	  released	  due	  to	  the	  incident,	  which	  was	  comparable	  to	  about	  one	  sixth	  of	  the	  radiation	  experienced	  from	  a	  chest	  x-­‐‑ray,	  “anti-­‐‑nuclear	  environmentalists	  used	  this	  opportunity	  to	  mislead	  the	  world	  about	  the	  impacts	  of	  radiation	  on	  human	  health”	  (U.S.	  NRC,	  2014;	  Walden,	  2013).	  While	  anti-­‐‑nuclear	  environmentalism	  was	  already	  strong	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  accident	  provided	  this	  faction	  with	  a	  reason	  to	  further	  substantiate	  their	  message.	  	  In	  response	  to	  public	  safety	  concerns	  even	  prior	  to	  Three	  Mile	  Island,	  increased	  government	  oversight	  and	  regulation	  was	  brought	  to	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  (US	  Power,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  Such	  regulations	  took	  form	  through	  the	  Energy	  Reorganization	  Act	  of	  1974,	  which	  established	  the	  Nuclear	  Regulatory	  Commission	  (NRC).	  After	  its	  founding,	  the	  Nuclear	  Regulatory	  Commission	  “made	  an	  effort	  to	  be	  an	  aggressive	  a	  foresighted	  regulator”	  (Rosenbaum,	  2002).	  It	  implemented	  a	  slew	  of	  additional	  regulations	  on	  nuclear	  generation	  facilities,	  such	  as	  design	  and	  equipment	  requirements,	  increased	  surveillance	  and	  staff	  training	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measures,	  and	  the	  establishing	  of	  a	  policing	  group	  to	  enforce	  these	  mandates	  called	  the	  Institute	  of	  Nuclear	  Power	  Operations,	  among	  others	  (U.S.	  NRC,	  2014).	  Such	  broad	  and	  robust	  regulations	  placed	  increased	  strain	  on	  the	  already	  withering	  industry.	  Due	  to	  environmentalist	  fear	  mongering,	  the	  economic	  blow	  of	  the	  Three	  Mile	  Island	  accident	  spread	  from	  that	  sole	  facility	  to	  the	  entire	  national	  industry.	  The	  resultant	  skepticism	  and	  public	  backlash	  against	  nuclear	  technology	  was	  enough	  to	  cancel	  or	  suspend	  numerous	  nuclear	  projects	  (US	  Power,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  	  	   Another	  occurrence	  that	  made	  the	  rising	  skepticism	  over	  the	  safety	  of	  nuclear	  generation	  particularly	  untimely	  was	  the	  OPEC	  Oil	  Embargo	  in	  1973.	  While	  this	  period	  of	  plummeting	  imports	  of	  foreign	  oil	  and	  soaring	  oil	  prices	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  highlight	  the	  capability	  of	  nuclear	  technology	  as	  an	  energy	  resource,	  nuclear	  development	  remained	  stagnant	  in	  the	  face	  of	  intense	  public	  opposition.	  The	  resultant	  energy	  shortage	  in	  the	  United	  States	  can	  therefore	  be	  partially	  attributed	  to	  societal	  adversity	  to	  nuclear	  energy,	  as	  increased	  nuclear	  generation	  at	  this	  time	  could	  have	  partially	  abated	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  oil	  crisis.	  Thus,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  somewhat	  ironic,	  the	  American	  public	  traded	  a	  misguided	  sense	  of	  safety	  for	  tangible	  economic	  downturn.	  Public	  feelings	  against	  nuclear	  generation	  carried	  through	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century,	  sustained	  largely	  in	  part	  by	  the	  nuclear	  accident	  in	  Chernobyl	  in	  1986	  as	  well	  as	  psychological	  tensions	  over	  nuclear	  technology	  resultant	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  During	  this	  period,	  there	  was	  a	  near	  halt	  in	  construction	  of	  new	  nuclear	  facilities,	  while	  electrical	  output	  from	  existing	  facilities	  increased	  due	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to	  improved	  capacity	  and	  load	  factors	  (US	  Power,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016;	  Figure	  1).	  	  	   After	  a	  thirty-­‐‑year	  “dark	  age”	  in	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  construction,	  interest	  in	  new	  development	  returned	  in	  response	  to	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Energy	  Policy	  Act	  of	  2005.	  This	  act	  provided	  tax	  credit	  incentives	  to	  nuclear	  generation	  facilities	  through	  an	  addition	  to	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Code	  titled	  “The	  Credit	  for	  Production	  from	  Advanced	  Nuclear	  Power”,	  which	  gives	  a	  tax	  credit	  of	  up	  to	  2.1	  cents	  per	  kWh	  for	  the	  first	  six	  thousand	  kWh	  in	  the	  first	  eight	  years	  of	  operation	  for	  new	  nuclear	  facilities	  (US	  Policy,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  It	  also	  provided	  federal	  loan	  guarantees	  for	  nuclear	  facilities	  through	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy	  (DOE)	  through	  a	  program	  titled	  “Incentives	  for	  Innovative	  Technologies”.	  In	  this	  program,	  the	  DOE	  would	  take	  over	  a	  generation	  facility	  and	  assume	  all	  financial	  responsibilities	  if	  the	  owner	  defaults	  on	  previously	  approved	  loans.	  Additionally,	  the	  act	  expanded	  the	  risk	  assurance	  for	  nuclear	  facility	  owners	  under	  the	  Price-­‐‑Anderson	  Act	  by	  establishing	  a	  pooled	  insurance	  fund.	  Under	  this	  policy,	  facility	  owners	  are	  required	  to	  carry	  a	  minimum	  amount	  of	  insurance	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  pooled	  fund.	  In	  return,	  the	  fund	  will	  cover	  all	  damage	  costs	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  nuclear	  disaster	  at	  a	  participant	  facility.	  Due	  to	  the	  favorable	  conditions	  established	  by	  the	  Energy	  Policy	  Act	  of	  2005,	  the	  nuclear	  generation	  industry	  saw	  a	  strong	  resurgence,	  with	  sixteen	  applications	  for	  new	  facilities	  filed	  to	  the	  NRC	  between	  2005	  and	  2008	  (Volpe,	  2015;	  US	  Policy,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  	  	   While	  federal	  policy	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  addressing	  many	  concerns	  relating	  to	  the	  nuclear	  industry,	  it	  has	  yet	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  surrounding	  nuclear	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waste	  disposal	  and	  storage.	  As	  of	  2011,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  sixty-­‐‑five	  thousand	  metric	  tons	  of	  spent	  nuclear	  fuel,	  an	  amount	  that	  is	  expected	  to	  double	  by	  2055,	  yet	  remains	  without	  a	  permanent	  site	  to	  store	  it	  all	  (Northey,	  2011).	  This	  issue	  continues	  to	  plague	  the	  industry,	  as	  determining	  “where,	  and	  how,	  to	  dispose	  of	  the	  enormous,	  highly	  toxic,	  and	  mounting	  volume	  of	  nuclear	  wastes	  in	  the	  United	  States…	  has	  been	  especially	  difficult	  to	  solve	  because	  reactor	  wastes	  incite	  great	  public	  fear	  and	  chronic	  conflict	  among	  federal,	  state,	  and	  local	  officials	  concerning	  where	  to	  put	  them”	  (Rosenbaum,	  2002).	  	  A	  federal	  attempt	  at	  solving	  this	  problem	  begun	  in	  1982	  through	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Waste	  Policy	  Act,	  which	  made	  the	  DOE	  responsible	  for	  selecting,	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “meticulously	  detailed,	  impartial,	  and	  open	  process”,	  a	  list	  of	  potential	  repository	  sites	  to	  be	  later	  chosen	  from	  (Rosenbaum,	  2002).	  In	  December	  1987,	  through	  this	  act,	  Congress	  selected	  Yucca	  Mountain,	  Nevada	  to	  be	  the	  nation’s	  first	  permanent	  nuclear	  waste	  repository	  (Rosenbaum,	  2002).	  However,	  the	  project	  was	  continuously	  delayed	  due	  to	  severe	  political	  backlash,	  where	  “Nevada	  continued	  to	  resist	  development	  of	  the	  Yucca	  Mountain	  facility	  with	  every	  political	  resource	  it	  had	  available”,	  along	  with	  technical	  quality	  and	  safety	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  its	  development	  (Rosenbaum,	  2002).	  In	  2010,	  the	  DOE	  terminated	  the	  project,	  which	  remained	  incomplete	  after	  accumulating	  over	  twelve	  billion	  dollars	  in	  project	  costs	  (Northey,	  2011).	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  federal	  repository	  remains	  a	  hindrance	  to	  the	  nuclear	  industry,	  as	  many	  states	  have	  enacted	  restrictions	  on	  development	  of	  nuclear	  facilities	  due	  to	  concerns	  over	  waste	  storage	  (Figure	  5).	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2.4	  Recent	  U.S.	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Policies:	  The	  Clean	  Power	  Plan	  and	  the	  
Transition	  to	  State-­‐‑Level	  Nuclear	  Support	  	   Since	  the	  Energy	  Policy	  Act	  in	  2005,	  federal	  policies	  have	  not	  further	  promoted	  the	  nuclear	  power	  industry.	  The	  last	  major	  piece	  of	  federal	  energy	  legislation,	  the	  EPA’s	  Clean	  Power	  Plan	  (CPP),	  which	  was	  finalized	  in	  August	  2015,	  remained	  consistent	  with	  this	  laissez-­‐‑faire	  treatment	  of	  nuclear	  generation.	  The	  CPP,	  which	  charged	  states	  to	  submit	  either	  individual	  or	  aggregated	  plans	  to	  cut	  carbon	  emissions	  from	  power	  plants	  by	  September	  2018,	  seeks	  to	  reduce	  the	  carbon	  footprint	  of	  the	  national	  electricity	  sector	  by	  an	  estimated	  thirty-­‐‑two	  percent	  below	  2005	  levels	  by	  2030	  (EPA,	  2015A).	  To	  achieve	  state	  level	  carbon	  reductions,	  the	  CPP	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  outlets	  for	  states	  to	  reduce	  their	  emissions	  by	  providing	  incentives	  to	  certain	  energy	  resources	  and	  technologies,	  including	  nuclear,	  which	  individual	  states	  can	  select	  or	  combine	  based	  on	  what	  is	  most	  sensible	  with	  their	  unique	  mix	  of	  generation	  resources.	  New	  York’s	  embracement	  of	  the	  CPP	  is	  displayed	  by	  its	  implementation	  of	  the	  CES.	  	  While	  these	  incentives	  express	  a	  preference	  for	  renewable	  energy	  development	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  transition	  from	  coal	  to	  natural	  has,	  nuclear	  generation	  did	  not	  receive	  the	  treatment	  that	  many	  in	  the	  industry	  had	  hoped	  for	  (Segal	  2016).	  The	  CPP,	  through	  limiting	  only	  nuclear	  generation	  from	  newly	  constructed	  or	  expanded	  facilities	  to	  count	  toward	  state	  emissions	  reduction	  goals,	  labels	  existing,	  original	  nuclear	  facilities	  as	  non-­‐‑assets	  in	  terms	  of	  state	  power	  plans.	  This	  means	  that	  existing	  facilities	  must	  be	  updated	  to	  expand	  their	  generating	  capacity	  to	  be	  counted	  toward	  state	  compliance.	  If	  not	  counted,	  a	  facility	  will	  not	  be	  eligible	  to	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receive	  any	  subsidies	  from	  their	  respective	  state,	  such	  as	  allowances	  or	  credits	  depending	  on	  the	  state’s	  compliance	  structure.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  CPP	  left	  existing	  nuclear	  facilities	  to	  “sink	  or	  swim	  in	  their	  own	  prospective	  economic	  performance”,	  leaving	  some	  facilities	  likely	  to	  face	  early	  closure	  due	  to	  marginal	  economic	  conditions	  in	  the	  present	  market	  (Bradford,	  2015;	  US	  Power,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  	  
	  
2.5	  Current	  State	  Policies	  and	  Stances	  on	  Nuclear	  Energy	  	  
	   While	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  subsidization	  program	  establishes	  the	  staunchest	  state-­‐‑level	  support	  for	  nuclear	  generation,	  numerous	  other	  states	  maintain	  or	  have	  recently	  passed	  statues	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  the	  growth	  of	  their	  nuclear	  assets.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  states	  that	  have	  taken	  such	  a	  stance,	  understandably,	  rely	  on	  nuclear	  resources	  for	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  their	  electricity	  generation.	  While	  such	  policies	  widely	  vary	  in	  their	  designs	  and	  organization,	  they	  are	  consistent	  in	  their	  function	  of	  reducing	  the	  economic	  risks	  of	  constructing	  and	  or	  operating	  nuclear	  facilities.	  Additionally,	  other	  states	  with	  little	  or	  no	  reliance	  on	  nuclear	  generation	  have	  begun	  to	  explore	  their	  potential	  for	  development	  of	  nuclear	  assets.	  Currently,	  thirty	  states	  operate	  one	  or	  more	  nuclear	  facilities	  that	  supply	  them	  with	  varying	  amounts	  of	  electricity	  generation	  (Figure	  4).	  	  For	  example,	  in	  2015	  Florida	  established	  a	  financing	  mechanism	  for	  utilities	  to	  recover	  certain	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  premature	  retirement	  of	  nuclear	  facilities.	  	  Georgia	  passed	  a	  legislative	  amendment	  in	  2009	  that	  permits	  utilities	  to	  recover	  from	  ratepayers	  the	  costs	  of	  financing	  associated	  with	  the	  construction	  of	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Total	  Capacity	  (MW)	   Total	  State	  Power	  (%)	  Alabama	   2	   5,067	   27.4	  Arkansas	   1	   3,937	   24.9	  Arizona	   1	   1,820	   28.7	  California	   1	   2240	   9.3	  Connecticut	   1	   15.8	   46.2	  Florida	   2	   3,572	   11.8	  Georgia	   2	   4,061	   26.4	  Illinois	   6	   11,564	   50.1	  Iowa	   1	   601	   9.2	  Kansas	   1	   1,175	   18.9	  Louisiana	   2	   2,133	   14.2	  Maryland	   1	   1,708	   40.2	  Massachusetts	   1	   677	   15.5	  Michigan	   3	   3,982	   25.7	  Minnesota	  	   2	   1,594	   20.9	  Mississippi	   1	   1,409	   18.1	  Missouri	   1	   1,193	   12.5	  Nebraska	   1	   764	   26.3	  New	  Hampshire	   1	   1,246	   47	  New	  Jersey	   3	   4,110	   44.2	  New	  York	   4	   5,432	   31.9	  North	  Carolina	   3	   5,095	   32.9	  Ohio	   2	   2,134	   14.2	  Pennsylvania	   5	   9,781	   37.3	  South	  Carolina	   4	   6,556	   55.1	  Tennessee	   2	   4,551	   33.1	  Texas	   2	   4,960	   8.7	  Virginia	   2	   3,568	   33.3	  Washington	   1	   1,158	   7.4	  Wisconsin	   1	   1,193	   15.0	  Source:	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2016C	  	  nuclear	  facilities.	  In	  2008,	  Kansas	  passed	  a	  similar	  bill	  allowing	  nuclear	  facilities	  to	  qualify	  for	  the	  recovery	  of	  preconstruction	  and	  construction	  based	  expenditures	  in	  rates,	  a	  treatment	  which	  it	  was	  previously	  exempt	  from	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2016A).	  In	  2016,	  Illinois	  passed	  the	  Future	  Energy	  Jobs	  Bill,	  which	  established	  a	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subsidy	  program	  to	  support	  two	  of	  its	  struggling	  nuclear	  facilities	  (Lyderson,	  2016).	  This	  particular	  legislation	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	  	  	  Some	  other	  states	  with	  less	  mature	  nuclear	  infrastructure	  have	  sought	  to	  explore	  the	  potential	  for	  development	  in	  their	  respective	  markets.	  In	  2014,	  Virginia	  passed	  a	  bill	  establishing	  the	  Virginia	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Consortium	  Authority	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  interdisciplinary	  study,	  research,	  and	  information	  resource	  on	  nuclear	  energy.	  Also	  in	  2014,	  Washington	  established	  a	  similar	  organization,	  the	  Joint	  Select	  Task	  Force	  on	  Nuclear	  Energy.	  In	  2013,	  Arkansas	  established	  an	  Institutional	  Energy	  Research	  Committee,	  which	  was	  tasked	  with	  researching	  the	  costs	  of	  additional	  energy	  production	  facilities,	  including	  nuclear,	  and	  other	  information	  such	  as	  its	  environmental	  challenges	  and	  possible	  policies	  and	  tax	  incentives	  to	  promote	  production	  increases.	  In	  2010,	  Iowa	  passed	  a	  bill	  requiring	  utilities	  to	  analyze	  and	  prepare	  for	  possible	  reconstruction	  of	  new	  nuclear	  facilities.	  A	  2011	  bill	  in	  Wyoming	  formed	  a	  task	  force	  to	  study	  ways	  to	  encourage	  nuclear	  power	  development	  in	  the	  state	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2016A).	  	  Despite	  cases	  of	  increased	  advocacy	  for	  nuclear	  development	  in	  some	  states,	  many	  others	  uphold	  restrictions	  of	  varied	  severity	  on	  the	  construction	  and	  operation	  of	  new	  nuclear	  facilities	  (Figure	  5).	  Minnesota	  passed	  a	  2016	  statute	  enacting	  an	  outright	  ban	  on	  constructing	  and	  relicensing	  nuclear	  facilities,	  as	  did	  New	  York	  in	  2014	  for	  the	  operation	  of	  nuclear	  facilities	  on	  Long	  Island,	  largely	  due	  to	  concerns	  over	  the	  population	  density	  and	  logistical	  difficulties	  in	  evacuating	  the	  area	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  facility	  mishap	  (NCSL,	  2016).	  Many	  other	  state	  moratoriums,	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Figure	  5:	  Current	  State	  Restrictions	  on	  Nuclear	  Power	  
State	   Condition(s)	  California	   Waste	  disposal	  capability	  Connecticut	   Waste	  disposal	  capability	  Hawaii	   Legislative	  approval	  (two-­‐‑thirds	  vote	  in	  each	  house	  of	  the	  legislature)	  Illinois	   Waste	  disposal	  capability	  OR	  legislative	  approval	  Kentucky	   Waste	  disposal	  capability	  Maine	   Waste	  disposal	  capability	  &	  Voter	  approval	  Massachusetts	   Majority	  voter	  approval	  	  &	  Legislative	  approval	  (with	  certain	  waste	  disposal,	  emergency	  preparedness,	  and	  other	  certain	  conditions	  are	  met)	  Minnesota	  	   Outright	  ban	  Montana	   Voter	  approval	  New	  Jersey	   Waste	  disposal	  safety	  New	  York	  	   Outright	  ban	  (limited	  to	  the	  counties	  of	  Suffolk	  and	  Nassua)	  Oregon	   Waste	  disposal	  capability	  &	  Voter	  approval	  Rhode	  Island	   Legislative	  approval	  Vermont	   Legislative	  approval	  West	  Virginia	  	   Waste	  disposal	  capability	  &	  Demonstrated	  economic	  feasibility	  &	  Compliance	  with	  environmental	  protection	  laws,	  rules,	  and	  requirements	  Source:	  NCSL,	  2016	  	  such	  as	  those	  in	  California,	  Maine,	  Connecticut,	  Illinois,	  Kentucky,	  New	  Jersey,	  Oregon,	  and	  West	  Virginia,	  are	  either	  entirely	  or	  largely	  founded	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  and	  the	  requirement	  of	  “the	  identification	  [of]	  a	  demonstrable	  technology	  or	  a	  means	  for	  high	  level	  waste	  disposal	  or	  reprocessing”	  (NCSL,	  2016).  Other	  states,	  namely	  Massachusetts,	  Illinois,	  Hawaii,	  Rhode	  Island,	  and	  Vermont,	  require	  varying	  levels	  of	  legislative	  support	  for	  new	  nuclear	  projects,	  while	  some,	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such	  as	  Massachusetts,	  Maine,	  Montana,	  and	  Oregon,	  also	  require	  majority	  voter	  approval	  to	  go	  forth	  with	  such	  projects	  (NCSL,	  2016).	  	  While	  standing	  moratoriums	  or	  restrictions	  on	  new	  nuclear	  facilities	  exist	  across	  fifteen	  states,	  others	  have	  recently	  created	  opportunities	  for	  new	  nuclear	  generation.	  The	  Alaska	  Sustainable	  Energy	  Act,	  enacted	  in	  2010,	  repealed	  the	  state’s	  prior	  moratorium	  on	  nuclear	  facilities,	  and	  allowed	  for	  small-­‐‑scale	  reactor	  development	  to	  be	  potentially	  funded	  by	  the	  state’s	  Power	  Project	  Fund	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2016).	  In	  2016,	  Wisconsin	  repealed	  its	  thirty-­‐‑three	  year	  old	  moratorium	  by	  passing	  a	  bill	  that	  withdrew	  requirements	  on	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal	  and	  other	  economic	  factors	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2016A;	  NCSL,	  2016).	  This	  bill	  also	  included	  nuclear	  generation	  in	  the	  state’s	  broader	  energy	  policy,	  creating	  potential	  for	  state	  loans	  and	  grants	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  nuclear	  facilities.	  	  	  Figure	  6	  provides	  an	  illustrative	  presentation	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  nuclear	  facilities	  across	  the	  United	  States,	  indicative	  of	  state	  and	  regional	  stances	  and	  utilization	  of	  nuclear	  energy.	  Figure	  6:	  U.S.	  Operating	  Commercial	  Nuclear	  Facilities	  
	  Source:	  U.S.	  NRC,	  2015	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2.6	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Generation,	  Policy,	  and	  Strategy	  in	  Foreign	  Nations	  	  	   While	  the	  United	  States	  commandingly	  leads	  the	  international	  community	  in	  raw	  nuclear	  electricity	  generation,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  the	  global	  leader	  in	  its	  utilization	  of	  the	  technology	  in	  fulfilling	  its	  electricity	  demand	  (Figure	  7;	  Figure	  8).	  By	  analyzing	  the	  treatment	  of	  nuclear	  generation	  in	  the	  leading	  nations	  in	  both	  nuclear	  load	  share	  and	  recent	  nuclear	  development,	  the	  policies	  and	  market	  strategies	  have	  successfully	  promoted	  such	  production,	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  such	  practices	  differ	  from	  those	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  can	  be	  identified.	  	  
2.6.1	  France	  	  
	   With	  fifty-­‐‑eight	  reactors	  that	  account	  for	  approximately	  seventy-­‐‑seven	  percent	  of	  its	  total	  electricity	  generation,	  France	  boasts	  the	  most	  impressive	  nuclear	  generation	  capacity	  of	  any	  nation	  (France,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  Along	  with	  providing	  the	  nation	  with	  reliable,	  low-­‐‑emissions	  electricity,	  France’s	  robust	  nuclear	  capabilities	  have	  made	  it	  the	  “largest	  electricity	  exporter	  on	  Earth”,	  allowing	  	  
Figure	  7:	  Top	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Consuming	  Nations,	  2015	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Figure	  8:	  Electricity	  Generation	  Fuel	  Share	  of	  Nuclear	  Energy	  by	  Nation,	  2015	  
	  Sources:	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2016C;	  World	  Nuclear	  Association	  –	  Nuclear	  Power	  in	  Russia,	  2016;	  World	  Nuclear	  Association	  –	  Nuclear	  Power	  in	  China,	  2016	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installation	  of	  fifty-­‐‑six	  nuclear	  reactors	  in	  the	  following	  fifteen	  years	  (Palfreman,	  1997).	  Surprisingly,	  this	  expeditious	  switch	  to	  nuclear	  met	  little	  backlash	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  societal,	  political,	  and	  economic	  forces.	  	  	   The	  precariousness	  of	  energy	  reliance	  from	  unstable	  regions,	  evidenced	  by	  the	  1973	  energy	  crisis,	  brought	  many	  to	  accept	  that	  nuclear	  development	  was	  a	  necessity	  in	  providing	  France	  with	  energy	  security.	  Secondly,	  French	  society	  trusts	  scientists	  and	  engineers	  much	  more	  so	  than	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  resulting	  in	  the	  viewing	  of	  such	  professionals	  as	  a	  technocratic	  elite	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  wide	  cultural	  popularity	  and	  acceptance	  of	  expansive	  government	  projects	  (Slovic	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Palfreman,	  1997).	  The	  French	  government	  has	  strengthened	  this	  cultural	  acceptance	  of	  nuclear	  through	  advertising	  campaigns	  that	  “reinforce	  the	  link	  between	  nuclear	  power	  and	  the	  electricity	  that	  makes	  modern	  life	  possible”,	  as	  well	  as	  public	  engagement	  initiatives	  by	  Électricité	  de	  France,	  the	  largely	  government	  owned	  utility	  that	  manages	  France’s	  nuclear	  fleet,	  which	  have	  attracted	  about	  six	  million	  French	  people	  to	  tour	  various	  nuclear	  facilities	  (Palfreman,	  1997).	  	  	   In	  2014,	  the	  tide	  began	  to	  turn	  against	  nuclear	  energy	  as	  the	  French	  government	  enacted	  a	  bill,	  titled	  the	  Energy	  Transition	  for	  Green	  Growth,	  that	  mandated	  a	  reduction	  in	  nuclear	  generation	  to	  account	  for	  fifty	  percent	  of	  the	  nation’s	  electricity	  supply	  by	  2025,	  along	  with	  a	  forty	  percent	  reduction	  in	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  by	  2030	  compared	  to	  1990	  levels	  (France,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016;	  World	  Nuclear	  News,	  2014).	  This	  bill	  came	  in	  response	  to	  rising	  public	  concern	  over	  the	  unavoidable,	  unsolved	  issue	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  desire	  to	  transition	  the	  nation’s	  energy	  mix	  toward	  renewable	  generation.	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While	  seeking	  to	  phase	  out	  nuclear,	  France’s	  ambitious	  goals	  toward	  carbon	  reduction	  and	  development	  of	  renewables	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  without	  its	  wealth	  of	  nuclear	  generation,	  which	  was	  accredited	  by	  Ségolène	  Royal,	  France’s	  energy	  minister,	  when	  stating,	  “It	  is	  thanks	  to	  nuclear	  energy	  that	  we	  can	  make	  this	  energy	  transition	  in	  an	  unperturbed	  way”	  (World	  Nuclear	  News,	  2014).	  	  
	  
2.6.2	  China	  	  
	   Unlike	  France,	  in	  China,	  nuclear	  development	  is	  in	  an	  embryonic	  stage	  with	  great	  potential	  to	  assist	  the	  rapidly	  developing	  nation.	  China’s	  enormous,	  unmet	  demand	  for	  energy,	  paired	  with	  its	  reliance	  on	  fossil	  fuels,	  makes	  nuclear	  development	  an	  important	  way	  to	  help	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions.	  While	  accounting	  for	  only	  three	  percent	  of	  China’s	  electricity	  generation	  in	  2015,	  nuclear	  experienced	  the	  largest	  generation	  growth	  of	  all	  energy	  resources	  at	  twenty-­‐‑nine	  percent	  (China,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016;	  BP,	  2016).	  This	  growth	  can	  be	  largely	  attributed	  to	  China’s	  commitment	  to	  greenhouse	  gas	  reduction	  and	  the	  selection	  of	  nuclear	  technology	  to	  aid	  in	  achieving	  related	  goals.	  In	  2015,	  China’s	  submission	  of	  its	  Intended	  Nationally	  Determined	  Contribution	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  pledged	  a	  twenty	  percent	  increase	  in	  fuel	  share	  from	  non-­‐‑fossil	  fuels,	  including	  annual	  average	  increases	  in	  new	  nuclear	  capacity	  of	  3.4	  GWe	  per	  year	  from	  2005	  to	  2020	  and	  of	  9.0	  GWe	  per	  year	  from	  2020	  to	  2030	  (C2ES,	  2015;	  China,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  In	  addition,	  China’s	  Thirteenth	  Five-­‐‑Year	  Plan,	  submitted	  in	  2016,	  mandated	  that	  six	  to	  eight	  new	  nuclear	  reactors	  be	  approved	  each	  year	  in	  part	  of	  an	  effort	  to	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reduce	  coal’s	  fuel	  share	  from	  sixty-­‐‑four	  point	  four	  percent	  in	  2015	  to	  sixty-­‐‑two	  percent	  in	  2020	  (China,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  	  Despite	  the	  high	  cost	  of	  nuclear	  facility	  construction,	  China’s	  high	  demand	  for	  energy	  and	  strong	  economic	  growth,	  along	  with	  preferential	  federal	  treatment	  toward	  nuclear,	  has	  ensured	  investment	  in	  nuclear	  development.	  Much	  of	  the	  federal	  partiality	  toward	  nuclear	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  tax	  policies,	  such	  as	  a	  seventy-­‐‑five	  percent	  tax	  rebate	  for	  reactors	  during	  their	  first	  five	  years	  of	  operation,	  a	  tax	  waiver	  for	  imports	  on	  nuclear	  energy	  equipment	  and	  raw	  materials	  that	  cannot	  be	  domestically	  produced,	  land-­‐‑use	  tax	  rebates	  on	  land	  associated	  with	  nuclear	  facilities,	  and	  a	  reduced	  fifteen	  percent	  income	  tax	  rate	  for	  nuclear	  energy	  companies	  (Zhou	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Other	  federal	  assistance	  includes	  liability	  assistance	  for	  nuclear	  facility	  operators,	  which	  was	  established	  in	  a	  2007	  bill	  that	  serves	  to	  “partially	  indemnify	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  against	  liability	  claims	  arising	  from	  nuclear	  accidents…	  [through]	  a	  no	  fault	  insurance-­‐‑type	  system”	  where	  operators	  annually	  pay	  into	  a	  trust	  fund	  that	  assures	  financial	  coverage	  for	  all	  potential	  damages	  resulting	  from	  such	  an	  incident	  (Zhou	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  Due	  to	  the	  combined	  factors	  of	  preferential	  government	  treatment	  through	  regulatory	  incentives	  and	  financial	  stimulus	  and	  a	  growing	  market	  demand	  for	  domestic	  electricity	  generation,	  Chinese	  nuclear	  generation	  has	  progressed	  beyond	  expectation.	  However,	  numerous	  requisites	  surrounding	  China’s	  nuclear	  program,	  such	  as	  ensured	  quality	  and	  safety	  of	  its	  facilities,	  apt	  technological	  research	  and	  development,	  and	  adequate	  workforce	  size	  to	  match	  the	  speed	  of	  its	  growth,	  remain	  a	  hindrance	  to	  having	  full	  confidence	  in	  its	  persisting	  development.	  While	  only	  time	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will	  tell	  if	  China	  can	  continue	  such	  rapid	  development	  while	  addressing	  these	  concerns,	  nuclear	  generation	  is	  positioned	  to	  beneficially	  and	  substantially	  impact	  China’s	  energy	  future.	  	  	  
2.6.3	  Russia	  	  	   Russia’s	  recent	  strides	  in	  nuclear	  energy	  development	  have	  made	  it	  a	  global	  leader	  in	  the	  field.	  Unlike	  China,	  where	  nuclear	  is	  incentivized	  by	  its	  ability	  to	  abate	  carbon	  emissions	  and	  pollution,	  the	  Russian	  transition	  to	  nuclear	  has	  been	  entirely	  driven	  by	  economics.	  As	  the	  supplier	  of	  twenty	  seven	  percent	  of	  the	  European	  Union’s	  natural	  gas,	  Russia	  is	  seeking	  to	  increase	  its	  gas	  exports	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  since	  it	  can	  earn	  roughly	  five	  times	  the	  revenue	  by	  exporting	  it	  compared	  to	  domestic	  sales	  (Russia,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  With	  about	  sixty	  percent	  of	  Russia’s	  natural	  gas	  being	  sold	  within	  its	  borders,	  the	  Russian	  government	  has	  expressed	  intent	  to	  halve	  this	  by	  2020	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  availability	  for	  export,	  and	  to	  replace	  that	  portion	  of	  domestic	  electricity	  through	  rapid	  deployment	  of	  nuclear	  and	  hydroelectric	  facilities	  (Russia,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016,	  World	  Nuclear	  News,	  2016).	  On	  top	  of	  five	  reactors	  currently	  under	  construction,	  the	  Russian	  government	  in	  August	  2016	  published	  a	  plan	  to	  construct	  eleven	  new	  reactors	  by	  2030	  and	  also	  approved	  of	  four	  separate	  disposal	  facilities	  for	  nuclear	  waste	  (Russia,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016;	  World	  Nuclear	  News,	  2016).	  Nuclear	  production	  in	  Russia	  accounted	  for	  just	  18.6%	  of	  total	  electricity	  generation	  in	  2015,	  but	  such	  rapid	  unit	  development,	  along	  with	  widespread	  uprating	  and	  the	  licensing	  of	  twenty-­‐‑four	  units	  for	  operational	  life	  extensions,	  has	  brought	  most	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recent	  federal	  estimates	  to	  	  20%-­‐‑30%	  nuclear	  share	  in	  electricity	  supply	  by	  2030,	  45%-­‐‑50%	  in	  2050	  and	  70%-­‐‑80%	  by	  2100	  (Russia,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016;	  Andreeva-­‐‑Andrievskaya,	  2015).	  	  	   Along	  with	  pursuing	  nuclear	  development	  for	  economic	  gain	  in	  natural	  gas	  exports,	  Russia	  has	  begun	  utilizing	  its	  expanding	  nuclear	  capabilities	  to	  gain	  market	  share	  in	  the	  $500	  billion	  global	  nuclear	  energy	  construction	  market,	  with	  37%	  of	  new	  nuclear	  facilities	  under	  construction	  worldwide	  being	  built	  by	  Russia	  (David,	  2014;	  Lecavalier	  2015).	  The	  success	  of	  Russia’s	  international	  nuclear	  development	  has	  been	  driven	  in	  pair	  by	  the	  growing	  desire	  for	  quick,	  easy	  energy	  supplies	  among	  nations	  that	  are	  technologically	  and	  financially	  incapable	  of	  developing	  nuclear	  facilities	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  programs	  to	  assist	  such	  nations	  in	  the	  financing	  and	  operation	  of	  nuclear	  facilities.	  Such	  programs	  include	  financing	  of	  nuclear	  development	  in	  host	  countries	  with	  costs	  recovered	  in	  energy	  sales,	  management	  of	  facilities,	  supplying	  of	  facilities	  with	  uranium	  fuel,	  and	  disposal	  of	  nuclear	  waste.	  This	  approach,	  dubbed	  “build-­‐‑own-­‐‑operate”	  or	  “BOO”,	  provides	  nations	  with	  a	  convenient	  “one-­‐‑stop-­‐‑shop”	  approach	  that	  is	  not	  offered	  by	  any	  other	  nation	  (Lecavalier,	  2015).	  	  	   Russia’s	  rapid	  advancement	  and	  global	  dissemination	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  has	  been	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  prioritization	  of	  nuclear	  development	  under	  the	  Russian	  government.	  Russia’s	  governmental	  centralization	  of	  nuclear	  assets	  under	  a	  single	  entity,	  The	  Rosatom	  State	  Energy	  Corporation,	  provides	  its	  government	  with	  complete	  autonomy	  and	  legislative	  expediency	  in	  national	  nuclear	  development.	  This	  has	  been	  expressed	  in	  the	  government’s	  $55	  billion	  investment,	  named	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
28	  
Proryv	  “Breakthrough”	  Initiative,	  to	  support	  research	  and	  development	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  by	  Rosatom	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  making	  Russia	  the	  global	  leader	  in	  nuclear	  technology	  (Lecavalier,	  2015;	  Russia,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  As	  a	  2016	  statement	  from	  Rosatom	  claimed	  that	  “Russia’s	  GDP	  gained	  three	  rubles	  for	  every	  one	  ruble	  invested	  in	  building	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  domestically,	  as	  well	  as	  enhanced	  socio-­‐‑economic	  development	  of	  the	  country	  as	  a	  whole”,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  Russia	  will	  continue	  on	  its	  track	  toward	  nuclear	  superiority	  (David,	  2014;	  Russia,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  	  	  
2.6.4	  Takeaways	  for	  the	  United	  States	  	  
	   These	  cases	  of	  the	  foreign	  involvement	  in	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  France,	  China,	  and	  Russia	  provide	  numerous	  lessons	  to	  be	  learned	  for	  the	  United	  States	  in	  terms	  of	  finding	  success	  with	  nuclear	  energy	  development.	  The	  French	  proactivity	  toward	  energy	  independence	  through	  nuclear	  development	  and	  the	  resultant	  abundance	  of	  domestically	  produced,	  low-­‐‑carbon	  electricity	  shows	  the	  tangible	  benefits	  of	  nuclear	  development	  for	  economic	  and	  security	  purposes.	  While	  the	  United	  States	  is	  not	  bestowed	  with	  the	  cultural	  conditions	  in	  France	  that	  produced	  a	  favorable	  societal	  opinion	  of	  nuclear	  energy,	  it	  can	  examine	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  this	  sentiment	  has	  been	  reinforced,	  such	  as	  advertisement	  and	  public	  engagement,	  to	  foster	  a	  wider	  acceptance	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  within	  its	  own	  society.	  The	  case	  of	  rapid	  nuclear	  development	  in	  China	  provides	  a	  more	  concrete	  proscription	  by	  displaying	  the	  merits	  of	  incentivizing	  new	  nuclear	  facilities	  through	  favorable	  federal	  tax	  policies.	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   While	  the	  United	  States	  does	  not	  posses	  the	  same	  governmental	  autonomy	  over	  nuclear	  development	  and	  energy	  market	  manipulation	  as	  seen	  in	  Russia,	  its	  comparable	  status	  in	  technological	  nuclear	  capability	  enables	  it	  to	  seriously	  examine	  Russia’s	  strategies	  within	  the	  global	  nuclear	  energy	  market.	  As	  the	  United	  States	  “currently	  lacks	  accords	  with	  key	  demand	  hubs	  in	  Asia	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  –areas	  where	  nuclear	  power	  is	  expected	  to	  soar,	  and	  ripe	  targets	  for	  Russian	  financing”,	  it	  stands	  to	  fall	  severely	  behind	  in	  the	  global	  market	  for	  nuclear	  energy	  development	  (David,	  2014).	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  being	  a	  missed	  economic	  opportunity,	  the	  lack	  of	  involvement	  by	  the	  United	  States	  in	  international	  nuclear	  development	  stands	  to	  diminish	  its	  role	  in	  international	  nuclear	  relations	  and	  control	  of	  nuclear	  materials	  (David,	  2014).	  This	  situation	  would	  decrease	  overall	  national	  security	  for	  the	  United	  States	  due	  to	  the	  inherent	  tie	  between	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  the	  development	  of	  nuclear	  weapons,	  in	  which	  “every	  known	  route	  to	  bombs	  involves	  either	  nuclear	  power	  or	  materials	  and	  technology	  which	  are	  available,	  which	  exist	  in	  commerce,	  as	  a	  direct	  and	  essential	  consequence	  of	  nuclear	  power”	  (Lovins,	  1981).	  Given	  the	  current	  landscape	  of	  international	  relations	  and	  tensions	  over	  nuclear	  weapons,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  weigh	  this	  factor	  into	  the	  overall	  cost	  of	  its	  inactivity	  in	  the	  international	  nuclear	  energy	  market.	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3.1	  Summary	  	   This	  chapter	  explores	  the	  causes	  and	  expected	  results	  of	  New	  York’s	  subsidization	  of	  nuclear	  generation,	  and	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  subsidies	  will	  have	  on	  the	  state’s	  nuclear	  industry.	  This	  discussion	  will	  examine	  the	  structure	  and	  trends	  occurring	  in	  the	  state’s	  energy	  market	  to	  determine	  why	  the	  program	  is	  necessary	  in	  preserving	  nuclear	  generation.	  Also,	  it	  will	  explore	  the	  potential	  impacts	  that	  a	  closure	  of	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  facilities	  would	  have	  on	  its	  economy	  and	  emission	  output	  to	  explain	  the	  state’s	  motivations	  behind	  this	  subsidization.	  	  	  	  
3.2	  The	  Economics	  of	  Struggling	  Nuclear	  Facilities	  	  	   Various	  trends	  within	  the	  energy	  industry	  and	  broader	  economy	  have	  resulted	  in	  significant	  fiscal	  difficulties	  for	  the	  four	  nuclear	  facilities	  operating	  in	  New	  York	  State.	  In	  response	  to	  these	  trends,	  the	  owners	  of	  these	  facilities,	  Exelon	  and	  Entergy,	  declared	  that	  they	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  prematurely	  close	  them,	  prompting	  the	  New	  York	  State	  government	  to	  provide	  these	  facilities	  with	  financial	  assistance	  to	  avoid	  the	  associated	  impacts	  of	  these	  closures	  (Walton,	  2016).	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  these	  economic	  forces	  are	  substantially	  responsible	  for	  the	  extensive	  nuclear	  subsidization	  program	  being	  examined	  in	  this	  paper.	  Exploring	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these	  trends	  and	  their	  expected	  impact	  on	  the	  New	  York	  power	  market	  and	  its	  nuclear	  facilities	  will	  explain	  the	  economic	  causes	  and	  necessity	  of	  these	  subsidies.	  	  
	  
3.2.1	  Primer	  on	  Electric	  Power	  Markets	  	  	   Before	  examining	  the	  market	  forces	  threatening	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  facilities,	  which	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  subsidy	  program,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  first	  discuss	  the	  general	  structure	  of	  power	  markets	  to	  understand	  how	  such	  forces	  have	  arisen.	  This	  discussion	  will	  explain	  the	  organizational	  differences	  between	  regulated	  and	  deregulated	  markets,	  the	  structure	  and	  relationship	  of	  wholesale	  and	  retail	  markets,	  and	  the	  jurisdictional	  differences	  between	  these	  market	  structures	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  how	  electricity	  generating	  entities	  are	  impacted	  by	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  markets	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	  	  	  
3.2.1.1	  Regulatory	  Market	  Structures	  	  
	   Power	  markets	  in	  the	  United	  States	  fall	  under	  two	  categories:	  regulated	  and	  deregulated	  markets.	  Regulated,	  or	  traditional,	  markets	  are	  characterized	  by	  vertically	  integrated	  utilities	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  generation,	  transmission,	  and	  distribution	  of	  electricity	  within	  a	  certain	  geographical	  area	  (Deliso,	  2014).	  By	  controlling	  all	  three	  levels	  of	  the	  supply	  chain,	  a	  utility	  is	  given	  ultimate	  authority	  and	  obliged	  with	  meeting	  all	  electricity	  demand	  within	  their	  domain	  (Michaels	  2006).	  In	  this	  structure,	  the	  flow	  of	  money	  is	  unidirectional,	  with	  utilities	  charging	  their	  ratepayers	  an	  aggregated	  fee	  that	  accounts	  for	  costs	  accrued	  along	  the	  three	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stages	  of	  service	  (Warwick,	  2002).	  While	  this	  structure	  provides	  organizational	  simplicity	  and	  efficiency,	  its	  monopolistic	  attribute	  holds	  ratepayers	  captive	  to	  utility	  rates	  and	  makes	  them	  vulnerable	  to	  complications	  with	  utility-­‐‑run	  generation	  facilities.	  To	  address	  these	  concerns	  and	  promote	  competition	  within	  power	  markets,	  a	  succession	  of	  federal	  rules,	  namely	  the	  Public	  Utilities	  Regulatory	  Policies	  Act	  of	  1978,	  the	  Energy	  Policy	  Act	  of	  1992,	  and	  FERC’s	  Open	  Access	  Policy	  in	  1996,	  opened	  up	  power	  generation	  to	  privately	  held	  “independent	  power	  producers”	  (IPPS)	  and	  allowed	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  deregulated	  power	  markets	  (Cain	  &	  Lesser,	  2007;	  Deliso,	  2014).	  	  In	  deregulated,	  or	  liberated,	  markets,	  utilities	  divest	  ownership	  of	  generation	  and	  transmission,	  and	  are	  only	  responsible	  for	  billing	  ratepayers	  and	  for	  the	  distribution,	  operations,	  and	  maintenance	  from	  the	  interconnection	  at	  the	  grid	  to	  the	  meter	  (Deliso,	  2014).	  Another	  differentiating	  characteristic	  of	  deregulated	  markets	  is	  that	  they	  feature	  regional	  transmission	  operators	  (RTOs),	  which	  are	  federally	  regulated	  entities	  that	  coordinate,	  control,	  and	  monitor	  the	  sale	  of	  electricity	  from	  IPPs	  into	  the	  grid	  via	  regional	  wholesale	  auctions	  (US	  Power,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  This	  auction	  process	  and	  the	  role	  of	  RTOs	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  shortly.	  Currently,	  seventeen	  states,	  including	  New	  York,	  and	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  operate	  with	  a	  deregulated	  electricity	  market	  (Figure	  9),	  with	  roughly	  forty-­‐‑five	  percent	  of	  the	  national	  generating	  capacity	  being	  made	  up	  by	  IPPs	  (Michaels,	  2006).	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3.2.1.2	  Wholesale	  and	  Retail	  Power	  Markets	  	   By	  turning	  over	  the	  responsibility	  of	  power	  generation	  to	  private	  entities,	  market	  deregulation	  allows	  for	  market	  competition	  to	  dictate	  which	  resources	  meet	  power	  demand	  within	  a	  grid.	  This	  market	  system	  operates	  through	  an	  auctioning	  	  
Figure	  9:	  Power	  Market	  Structure	  by	  State	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Electric	  Choice,	  2017	  	  	  process	  called	  the	  power	  exchange	  that	  “determines	  which	  plants	  operate	  and	  what	  they	  are	  paid	  for	  power”	  (Warwick,	  2002).	  In	  this	  process,	  which	  is	  managed	  by	  the	  respective	  RTO,	  the	  exchange	  itself	  acts	  as	  the	  single	  buyer	  of	  power	  with	  multiple	  sellers.	  The	  chosen	  sellers	  and	  price	  are	  determined	  in	  a	  “single	  bid”	  system	  wherein	  the	  winning,	  or	  highest,	  bid	  sets	  the	  price	  earned	  for	  all	  sellers,	  which	  is	  called	  the	  “market	  clearing	  price”	  (MCP),	  thus	  producing	  a	  least-­‐‑cost	  result	  by	  giving	  market	  entry	  on	  a	  lowest-­‐‑cost-­‐‑first	  basis	  (Warwick,	  2002).	  It	  is	  through	  this	  power	  exchange	  system,	  where	  IPPs	  compete	  to	  offer	  their	  services	  at	  the	  lowest	  possible	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price,	  in	  which	  wholesale	  power	  is	  sold	  into	  the	  grid	  (Michaels,	  2006).	  Figure	  10	  provides	  a	  helpful	  visualization	  of	  this	  wholesale	  power	  auctioning	  structure.	  	   Conversely,	  retail	  markets	  exist	  after	  the	  dispatch	  of	  power	  by	  RTOs,	  where	  residential,	  commercial,	  and	  industrial	  customers	  purchase	  power	  from	  LSEs	  for	  use	  at	  the	  meter	  (Cain	  &	  Lesser,	  2007).	  Pricing	  in	  retail	  markets	  is	  largely	  dependent	  on	  wholesale	  market	  prices	  and	  utility	  operations.	  To	  determine	  retail	  electricity	  prices,	  wholesale	  prices	  are	  combined	  with	  transmission	  charges,	  which	  include	  the	  cost	  of	  moving	  high-­‐‑voltage	  electricity	  from	  a	  generation	  facility	  to	  a	  distribution	  station,	  “wire	  charges”,	  which	  are	  utility	  fees	  related	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  to	  end-­‐‑use	  customers,	  and	  state	  charges,	  which	  include	  sales	  tax	  and	  public	  benefits	  programs,	  such	  as	  low-­‐‑income	  assistance	  or	  resource	  subsidies	  (Warwick,	  2002).	  The	  transmission	  component	  typically	  accounts	  for	  less	  than	  ten	  percent	  of	  a	  typical	  total	  retail	  bill,	  while	  wire	  charges	  usually	  account	  for	  one-­‐‑half	  to	  two-­‐‑thirds,	  with	  state	  charges	  largely	  varying	  (Warwick,	  2002).	  	  
Figure	  10:	  Power	  Exchange	  Auctioning	  Process	  
	  	  Source:	  Warwick,	  2002	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3.2.1.3	  Regulatory	  Jurisdiction:	  Framework	  and	  Shortfalls	  	  	  	   In	  managing	  the	  deregulation	  of	  power	  markets,	  the	  Federal	  Energy	  Regulatory	  Commission	  (FERC)	  conceptualized	  RTOs	  as	  entities	  to	  create	  an	  “operational	  separation	  of	  generation	  and	  transmission	  services	  and	  a	  surrender	  of	  control	  of	  the	  power	  grid”	  (Michaels,	  2006).	  The	  formation	  of	  RTOs	  effectively	  prevented	  utility	  market	  manipulation	  by	  creating	  separation	  between	  ownership	  and	  operation	  of	  regional	  transmission	  systems	  (Cain	  &	  Lesser,	  2007).	  However,	  as	  independent	  organizations	  that	  singlehandedly	  manage	  wholesale	  markets,	  FERC	  stressed	  that	  RTOs	  were	  to	  be	  highly	  regulated	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  power	  exchange	  was	  administered	  in	  an	  unbiased	  manner	  so	  that	  “competitive	  wholesale	  markets	  are	  truly	  competitive”	  (Michaels,	  2006;	  Cain	  &	  Lesser,	  2007).	  The	  founding	  statutes	  of	  RTOs,	  FERC	  Order	  888	  and	  2000,	  involved	  numerous	  oversight	  stipulations	  related	  to	  ensuring	  integrity	  in	  wholesale	  markets,	  including	  the	  establishment	  of	  market-­‐‑monitoring	  institutions	  (MMIs),	  which	  are	  independent	  entities	  charged	  with	  scrutinizing	  bidding	  behavior,	  employing	  FERC-­‐‑approved	  mitigation	  techniques,	  and	  reporting	  to	  RTOs	  and	  FERC	  on	  activity	  within	  a	  regional	  power	  exchange	  (Michaels,	  2006;	  Cain	  &	  Lesser,	  2007).	  FERC’s	  enforcement	  capabilities	  were	  significantly	  expanded	  through	  the	  Energy	  Policy	  Act	  of	  2005,	  which	  bolstered	  	  its	  civil	  and	  criminal	  penalty	  authority	  in	  penalizing	  wholesale	  market	  manipulation	  	  	  (Cain	  &	  Lesser,	  2007).	  	  	  The	  regulation	  of	  RTOs	  by	  MMIs	  can	  vary	  in	  organizational	  structure.	  In	  some	  RTO’s,	  such	  as	  NYISO,	  the	  respective	  MMI	  is	  a	  partially	  internal	  entity	  that	  includes	  members	  of	  the	  RTO	  itself.	  In	  addition	  to	  their	  in-­‐‑house	  staff,	  MMIs	  can	  include	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external	  monitoring	  from	  members	  of	  the	  private	  sector,	  such	  as	  distinguished	  academics,	  lawyers,	  or	  contracted	  firms.	  For	  example,	  NYISO,	  along	  with	  ISO-­‐‑NE,	  MISO,	  and	  ERCOT,	  have	  contracts	  with	  the	  consulting	  firm	  Potomac	  Economics	  to	  perform	  this	  duty	  (Michaels,	  2008).	  	  In	  some	  cases	  RTOs	  can	  be	  subcategorized	  as	  independent	  system	  operators	  (ISOs),	  which	  vary	  little	  in	  function	  apart	  from	  the	  typically	  smaller	  geographical	  range	  in	  which	  they	  operate	  (Figure	  11).	  While	  FERC	  demonstrates	  total	  jurisdictional	  authority	  over	  wholesale	  markets,	  interstate	  transmission,	  and	  the	  RTOs	  that	  oversee	  these	  processes,	  utility	  distribution	  and	  retail	  sale	  of	  power	  is	  regulated	  at	  the	  state	  level	  by	  respective	  state	  commissions	  (Federal	  Power	  Act,	  2015;	  Warwick,	  2002).	  	  Despite	  its	  apparent	  straightforwardness,	  the	  current	  jurisdictional	  framework	  of	  power	  markets	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  significant	  gray	  area	  surrounding	  regulatory	  influence	  on	  power	  exchange	  access	  and	  wholesale	  rates	  (Warwick,	  2002).	  This	  issue	  can	  be	  attributed	  in	  part	  to	  the	  general	  novelty	  of	  this	  jurisdictional	  framework,	  which	  has	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  “much	  of	  U.S.	  electricity	  is	  now	  governed	  by	  organizations	  for	  which	  there	  are	  no	  precedents	  in	  any	  industrial	  context	  as	  important	  as	  electricity”	  (Michaels,	  2006).	  Additionally,	  it	  can	  be	  blamed	  on	  the	  policy-­‐‑creation	  process	  behind	  this	  framework,	  which	  could	  be	  identified	  as	  “a	  politically	  expedient	  compromise	  rather	  than	  a	  thoughtfully	  planned	  institution”,	  resulting	  in	  a	  failure	  to	  address	  “the	  difficulties	  in	  governance	  that	  such	  an	  organization	  [RTO]	  might	  actually	  encounter”	  when	  implemented	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Figure	  11:	  North	  American	  RTO	  Service	  Territories	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-­‐‑act/rto.asp	  	  	  (Michaels,	  2006).	  Regardless	  of	  their	  causes,	  the	  resultant	  policy	  imperfections	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  jurisdictional	  authority	  across	  deregulated	  power	  markets	  have	  created	  several	  uncertainties	  over	  the	  legality	  of	  state-­‐‑level	  market	  manipulation	  initiatives,	  spurring	  disagreement	  between	  FERC	  and	  state	  commissions.	  The	  relevance	  of	  this	  unperfected	  framework	  to	  New	  York	  State’s	  proposed	  subsidization	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  the	  transformative	  impact	  that	  this	  program	  could	  have	  on	  the	  wider	  debate	  of	  jurisdiction	  over	  wholesale	  power	  markets	  will	  be	  further	  investigated	  in	  Chapter	  Four	  when	  discussing	  the	  legality	  of	  using	  ZECs	  to	  financially	  preserve	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  facilities.	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3.2.2	  Falling	  Natural	  Gas	  Prices	  	   Natural	  gas	  prices	  in	  New	  York,	  much	  like	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  have	  substantially	  decreased	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  (Figure	  12).	  This	  trend	  is	  due	  to	  a	  host	  of	  factors,	  particularly	  technological	  improvements	  in	  horizontal	  drilling	  and	  hydraulic	  fracturing	  and	  the	  abundance	  of	  natural	  gas	  within	  the	  nearby	  Marcellus	  and	  Utica	  shale	  formations,	  which	  have	  jointly	  accounted	  for	  about	  eighty-­‐‑five	  percent	  of	  growth	  in	  U.S.	  natural	  gas	  production	  since	  2012	  (Kern	  &	  Characklis,	  2017;	  Ausick	  2015).	  In	  result,	  electricity	  generation	  from	  natural	  gas	  roughly	  doubled	  in	  New	  York	  between	  2004	  and	  2014,	  and	  now	  about	  forty	  percent	  of	  its	  electricity	  comes	  from	  natural	  gas,	  making	  it	  the	  state’s	  largest	  generation	  resource	  (Figure	  13;	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2014).	  Due	  to	  its	  deregulated	  structure,	  the	  New	  York	  power	  market	  has	  been	  profoundly	  impacted	  by	  this	  influx	  of	  inexpensive	  natural	  gas,	  as	  its	  increasingly	  low,	  competitive	  price	  “is	  allowing	  gas-­‐‑fired	  plants	  to	  undercut	  [nuclear]	  power	  prices”	  (US	  Power,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2016).	  	  	  
Figure	  12:	  Price	  of	  Natural	  Gas	  Delivered	  to	  New	  York	  Residential	  Customers,	  2006-­‐‑2016	  (Dollars/Thousand	  Cubic	  Feet)	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Figure	  13:	  New	  York	  Natural	  Gas	  Generation	  (thousand	  GWh),	  2004	  –	  2014	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Figure	  14:	  Natural	  Gas	  and	  Peak	  Wholesale	  Electricity	  Prices,	  2010-­‐‑2014	  
	  Source:	  Davis	  &	  Hausman,	  2016	  	  	  
3.2.3	  Growth	  of	  Renewables	  	   While	  far	  more	  modest	  than	  that	  of	  natural	  gas,	  New	  York	  has	  also	  experienced	  an	  increase	  in	  renewable	  energy,	  which	  grew	  from	  twenty	  to	  about	  twenty	  five	  percent	  of	  total	  electricity	  generation	  from	  2010	  to	  2014	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2014;	  NYSERDA,	  2014).	  The	  majority	  of	  this	  generation	  capacity	  comes	  from	  hydroelectric	  sources,	  which	  makes	  up	  just	  over	  eighteen	  percent	  of	  statewide	  electricity	  generation	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2014).	  The	  uptick	  in	  renewables	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  growth	  in	  wind	  energy	  generation,	  which	  multiplied	  by	  about	  four	  hundred	  from	  2004	  to	  2014	  (Figure	  15).	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  increases	  in	  solar	  power	  capacity,	  which	  more	  than	  quadrupled	  in	  New	  York	  from	  2010	  to	  2014	  (NYSERDA,	  2014).	  The	  recent	  growth	  of	  these	  three	  resources	  and	  their	  contribution	  to	  New	  York’s	  renewable	  generation	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  16.	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Figure	  15:	  New	  York	  Wind	  Energy	  Generation	  (thousand	  GWh),	  2004	  –	  2014	  
	  Source:	  EIA,	  2017	  	  	   Figure	  16:	  New	  York	  Renewable	  Energy	  Generation	  by	  Resource	  (thousand	  GWh)	  2004	  –	  2014	  


































	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
42	  
available	  to	  wholesale	  competition	  and	  consequentially	  drives	  down	  the	  MCP	  received	  by	  nuclear	  facilities.	  This	  paradoxical	  situation,	  where	  renewable	  growth	  adds	  pressure	  on	  existing	  nuclear	  facilities,	  has	  been	  dubbed	  “clean	  energy	  cannibalism”,	  as	  expansion	  of	  several	  emission-­‐‑free	  technologies	  is	  harming	  another	  emission-­‐‑free	  technology	  (Pyper,	  2017).	  	  Due	  to	  New	  York’s	  promotion	  of	  renewables	  through	  the	  “50	  by	  30”	  initiative	  and	  administration	  of	  RECs,	  this	  trend	  is	  expected	  to	  intensify	  in	  coming	  years.	  Such	  growth	  has	  already	  begun,	  with	  the	  recent	  announcement	  of	  a	  90	  megawatt	  offshore	  wind	  farm	  project	  to	  be	  constructed	  off	  the	  coast	  of	  Long	  Island,	  which	  will	  be	  the	  first	  installment	  of	  Governor	  Cuomo’s	  commitment	  to	  reach	  2.4	  gigawatts	  of	  state	  offshore	  wind	  generation	  by	  2030,	  which	  will	  be	  the	  largest	  wind	  energy	  project	  in	  the	  United	  States	  upon	  completion	  (Cardwell,	  2017).	  	  Additionally,	  Cuomo	  announced	  in	  his	  2017	  State	  of	  State	  address	  that	  New	  York	  will	  award	  three	  hundred	  seventy	  million	  dollars	  this	  year	  to	  eleven	  large-­‐‑scale	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  across	  the	  state,	  which	  is	  expected	  to	  result	  in	  over	  two	  hundred	  sixty	  megawatts	  of	  new	  renewable	  capacity	  (NYSERDA,	  2017).	  	  	  
3.3	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  Nuclear	  Closures	  	  	   While	  the	  fiscal	  difficulties	  encountered	  by	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  facilities	  are	  evident	  through	  declining	  profitability,	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  state’s	  controversial	  decision	  to	  financially	  support	  and	  prevent	  the	  closure	  of	  these	  facilities	  is	  more	  complex	  and	  comprehensive.	  Explaining	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  subsidization	  requires	  consideration	  of	  the	  various	  impacts	  that	  such	  a	  closure	  would	  entail,	  particularly	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
43	  
local	  and	  statewide	  economic	  influence	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  state	  emissions	  reduction	  goals.	  By	  explaining	  the	  potential	  ramifications	  that	  a	  total	  shutdown	  of	  nuclear	  facilities	  would	  entail,	  the	  rationale	  behind	  New	  York’s	  desire	  to	  prevent	  them	  and	  its	  consequent	  support	  of	  nuclear	  facilities	  through	  ZEC’s	  will	  become	  evident.	  	  	   An	  important	  aspect	  of	  this	  discussion	  will	  be	  the	  projected	  impacts	  and	  concerns	  surrounding	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  Indian	  Point	  nuclear	  facility.	  On	  January	  9,	  2017,	  it	  was	  announced	  that	  Governor	  Cuomo	  and	  Entergy,	  the	  owner	  of	  Indian	  Point,	  had	  reached	  an	  agreement	  to	  fully	  shut	  down	  the	  facility	  by	  April	  2021	  (McGeehan,	  2017).	  This	  agreement,	  which	  was	  driven	  by	  financial	  motives	  for	  Entergy	  due	  to	  the	  facility’s	  declining	  profitability	  and	  by	  political	  pressures	  stemming	  from	  safety	  concerns	  for	  the	  state	  due	  to	  the	  facility’s	  close	  proximity	  to	  New	  York	  City,	  spurred	  much	  investigation	  into	  the	  expected	  impact	  of	  the	  shutdown	  (US	  Power,	  World	  Nuclear	  Association,	  2017).	  Information	  gathered	  from	  such	  analyses	  can	  be	  used	  to	  extrapolate	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  full-­‐‑scale	  shutdown	  of	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  facilities.	  	  	  
3.3.1	  Economic	  Outlook	  	  	  	   Economic	  concerns	  over	  Indian	  Point’s	  announced	  closure	  are	  present	  across	  municipal	  and	  state	  levels.	  For	  the	  officials	  and	  residents	  of	  Westchester	  County,	  where	  Indian	  Point	  has	  operated	  for	  over	  fifty	  years,	  these	  concerns	  mainly	  stem	  from	  the	  expected	  loss	  of	  local	  jobs	  and	  tax	  revenue.	  Currently,	  Indian	  Point	  employs	  about	  one	  thousand	  fulltime	  workers,	  making	  it	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  employers	  in	  Westchester	  County	  with	  an	  annual	  payroll	  of	  about	  $140	  million	  dollars,	  and	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stimulates	  almost	  three	  thousand	  additional	  jobs	  in	  surrounding	  counties	  (McGeehan,	  2017;	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2015A).	  In	  addition,	  Indian	  Point	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  contributors	  to	  the	  municipal	  tax	  base,	  as	  it	  directly	  generates	  roughly	  four	  million	  dollars	  annually	  in	  taxes	  for	  Westchester	  County	  (Whitman,	  2017;	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2015A).	  Most	  directly	  impacted	  by	  this	  tax	  decrease	  will	  likely	  be	  the	  local	  school	  district,	  Hendrick	  Hudson,	  as	  it	  receives	  twenty-­‐‑three	  million	  dollars	  of	  Entergy’s	  annual	  tax	  payments,	  accounting	  for	  about	  one-­‐‑third	  of	  its	  total	  budget	  (Spector,	  2017).	  However,	  this	  loss	  of	  tax	  revenue	  from	  Indian	  Point	  transcends	  the	  municipal	  level,	  as	  the	  facility	  annually	  accounts	  for	  about	  seventy	  million	  dollars	  in	  state	  and	  local	  taxes	  and	  about	  two	  hundred	  seventy	  million	  in	  federal	  taxes	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2015A).	  	  Additional	  regional	  and	  state	  level	  economic	  concerns	  surrounding	  Indian	  Point’s	  closure	  mainly	  arise	  from	  the	  cost	  of	  decommissioning	  the	  facility,	  which	  is	  a	  lengthy	  and	  expensive	  endeavor	  that	  Entergy	  estimated	  in	  2010	  would	  cost	  just	  over	  one	  billion	  dollars	  to	  complete	  (Nearing,	  2017).	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  billion-­‐‑dollar	  estimate	  is	  that	  it	  greatly	  exceeds	  the	  seven	  hundred	  twenty-­‐‑four	  million	  dollar	  fund	  reserved	  for	  the	  decommissioning	  of	  the	  facility,	  which	  was	  given	  to	  Entergy	  from	  New	  York	  State	  in	  2000	  when	  Indian	  Point	  was	  purchased	  from	  the	  state-­‐‑owned	  New	  York	  Power	  Authority	  (Nearing,	  2017).	  	  While	  this	  fund	  remains	  invested	  and	  has	  grown	  almost	  a	  quarter	  billion	  dollars	  over	  the	  past	  six	  years,	  and	  while	  Entergy	  has	  expressed	  that	  the	  original	  decommissioning	  cost	  estimate	  needs	  to	  be	  reevaluated,	  decommissioning	  funds	  for	  Indian	  Point	  will	  remain	  a	  worrisome	  matter	  until	  it	  is	  settled	  due	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  project	  cost	  overruns	  and	  the	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“unanswered	  question	  as	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  any	  taxpayer	  liability	  as	  a	  result”	  (Whitman,	  2017;	  Nearing,	  2017).	  	  	  	   Other	  concerns	  involve	  the	  potential	  impact	  that	  the	  closure	  will	  have	  on	  the	  regional	  electricity	  grid	  and	  prices.	  As	  Indian	  Point	  annually	  supplies	  New	  York	  City	  and	  Westchester	  County	  with	  over	  two	  gigawatts,	  roughly	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  power	  consumed	  in	  the	  area,	  there	  is	  concern	  over	  how	  this	  substantial	  base	  load	  capacity	  will	  be	  replaced	  (McGeehan,	  2017;	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2014).	  While	  the	  state’s	  commitment	  to	  expansion	  of	  renewables,	  such	  as	  the	  aforementioned	  2.4	  gigawatts	  of	  offshore	  wind	  by	  2030,	  has	  quelled	  some	  of	  these	  concerns	  and	  even	  made	  some	  optimistic	  about	  regional	  job	  creation,	  the	  developmental	  progress	  of	  such	  projects	  remains	  uncertain	  (Spector,	  2017).	  The	  cost	  of	  this	  alteration	  in	  the	  regional	  energy	  mix	  is	  also	  uncertain.	  Although	  the	  state	  has	  urged	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  process	  on	  “ratepayers	  would	  be	  negligible,	  adding	  that	  the	  governor’s	  office	  had	  estimated	  that,	  at	  most,	  the	  proposed	  shutdown	  would	  add	  three	  dollars	  a	  month	  to	  electric	  bills	  in	  the	  New	  York	  City	  area”,	  electricity	  rates	  in	  this	  area	  are	  the	  highest	  in	  the	  nation,	  apart	  from	  Hawaii,	  so	  these	  rate	  increases	  are	  especially	  unwelcome	  (McGeehan,	  2017;	  Spector,	  2017).	  	  The	  fiscal	  repercussions	  that	  are	  being	  anticipated	  due	  to	  the	  announced	  closure	  of	  Indian	  Point	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  being	  prevented	  through	  the	  subsidization	  of	  New	  York’s	  upstate	  facilities	  of	  Ginna,	  Fitzpatrick,	  and	  Nine	  Mile.	  On	  the	  municipal	  level,	  however,	  the	  discrepancy	  in	  municipal	  size	  and	  economic	  conditions	  between	  Indian	  Point’s	  Westchester	  County,	  Ginna’s	  Wayne	  County,	  and	  Fitzpatrick’s	  and	  Nine	  Mile’s	  Oswego	  County,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  17,	  would	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Figure	  17:	  Discrepancy	  Between	  New	  York’s	  Nuclear	  Counties	  County	   Westchester	   Oswego	   Wayne	  Population	  (July	  2015	  estimate)	   976,396	   120,146	   91,446	  Average	  Household	  Income	   $81,946	   $48,051	   $52,601	  Unemployment	  Rate	  (December	  2016)	   4.0%	   6.7%	   5.2%	  Source:	  NYS	  Department	  of	  Labor,	  2016;	  US	  Census	  Bureau,	  2016;	  Index	  Mundi,	  2013	  	  increase	  the	  severity	  of	  local	  impacts	  in	  the	  event	  of	  upstate	  facility	  closures.	  For	  example,	  Oswego	  County,	  which	  has	  the	  fourth	  highest	  unemployment	  rate	  out	  of	  New	  York’s	  sixty-­‐‑two	  counties	  and	  an	  average	  household	  income	  of	  only	  forty-­‐‑eight	  thousand	  dollars,	  relies	  heavily	  on	  Fitzpatrick	  and	  Nine	  Mile	  as	  monetary	  resources	  (NYS	  Department	  of	  Labor,	  2016;	  Index	  Mundi,	  2013).	  Together,	  the	  two	  facilities	  account	  for	  sixteen	  hundred	  jobs,	  with	  an	  average	  annual	  salary	  of	  about	  one	  hundred	  twenty	  thousand	  dollars	  (Klepper,	  2017).	  When	  speaking	  on	  importance	  of	  these	  jobs	  to	  the	  city	  of	  Oswego,	  the	  Mayor	  Billy	  Barlow	  remarked,	  “These	  aren’t	  just	  normal	  jobs.	  These	  are	  high	  paying	  jobs,	  the	  people	  who	  eat	  in	  our	  restaurants,	  shop	  in	  our	  stores,	  who	  make	  our	  community	  what	  it	  is”	  (Klepper,	  2017).	  In	  Wayne	  County,	  Ginna	  employs	  about	  seven	  hundred	  people,	  and	  adds	  another	  eight	  hundred	  to	  one	  thousand	  jobs	  during	  maintenance	  and	  refueling	  periods	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Industry,	  2015B).	  An	  additional	  significance	  of	  these	  facilities	  is	  their	  creation	  of	  secondary	  jobs	  in	  industries	  that	  provide	  goods	  and	  services	  related	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  facilities,	  such	  as	  jobs	  in	  construction,	  food	  services,	  and	  sales	  (Berkman	  &	  Murphy,	  2015).	  Altogether,	  the	  three	  upstate	  facilities	  account	  for	  about	  twenty-­‐‑five	  thousand	  in-­‐‑state	  fulltime	  jobs,	  meaning	  that	  their	  closure	  would	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likely	  raise	  the	  region’s	  already	  high	  unemployment	  rates	  (Berkman	  &	  Murphy,	  2015).	  	  	  	  Additional	  importance	  of	  these	  facilities	  stems	  from	  their	  production	  of	  significant	  local	  and	  state	  tax	  revenues	  and	  economic	  output	  through	  both	  direct	  and	  secondary	  economic	  activity.	  From	  the	  years	  2015	  to	  2024,	  they	  are	  estimated	  to	  produce	  an	  average	  annual	  tax	  revenue	  of	  144.5	  million	  dollars	  and	  576.4	  million	  on	  the	  state	  and	  federal	  level,	  respectively	  (Berkman	  &	  Murphy,	  2015).	  While	  these	  figures	  only	  account	  for	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  tax	  revenues,	  this	  impact	  is	  amplified	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  For	  instance,	  Ginna	  is	  the	  largest	  taxpayer	  in	  Wayne	  County,	  directly	  contributing	  over	  ten	  million	  dollars	  in	  state	  and	  local	  property	  and	  sales	  taxes	  in	  2014	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2015B).	  Additionally,	  these	  facilities	  contribute	  over	  three	  billion	  dollars	  to	  the	  state	  GDP	  through	  the	  direct	  and	  secondary	  economic	  activity	  that	  they	  create	  (Berkman	  &	  Murphy,	  2015).	  	  Through	  these	  amounts,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  closure	  of	  Indian	  Point	  stands	  to	  severely	  impact	  Westchester	  County,	  and	  that	  similar	  impacts	  would	  be	  expected	  in	  the	  respective	  communities	  of	  New	  York’s	  upstate	  facilities	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  closure.	  Due	  to	  the	  drastic	  importance	  of	  these	  facilities	  to	  upstate	  New	  York,	  an	  area	  already	  experiencing	  financial	  downturns,	  and	  the	  overall	  economic	  benefit	  that	  the	  subsidization	  program	  stands	  to	  have,	  Cuomo	  remarked	  during	  his	  announcement	  of	  the	  program	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  “the	  state	  has	  a	  moral	  obligation,	  a	  financial	  obligation	  and	  a	  civic	  obligation	  to	  step	  in”	  (Klepper,	  2017).	  Another	  impact	  of	  these	  facilities	  worth	  considering	  is	  their	  role	  in	  curbing	  electricity	  prices.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  upstate	  nuclear	  generation,	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	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New	  York’s	  wholesale	  electricity	  prices	  would	  rise	  ten	  dollars	  per	  MWh,	  which	  translates	  into	  an	  annual	  increase	  of	  over	  1.7	  billion	  dollars	  on	  state	  ratepayer	  bills	  (Berkman	  &	  Murphy,	  2015).	  If	  these	  estimates	  are	  correct,	  the	  subsidy	  program	  stands	  to	  prevent	  over	  twenty	  billion	  dollars	  in	  total	  bill	  increases	  over	  its	  twelve-­‐‑year	  duration.	  With	  its	  anticipated	  cost	  of	  7.6	  billion	  dollars,	  to	  be	  covered	  through	  an	  increase	  of	  two	  dollars	  per	  month	  on	  retail	  electricity	  bills,	  the	  subsidization	  makes	  financial	  sense	  due	  to	  its	  overall	  impact	  on	  ratepayer	  savings	  alone	  (Klepper,	  2017).	  Along	  with	  the	  local	  and	  statewide	  benefits	  of	  preserving	  upstate	  nuclear	  generation	  through	  the	  retention	  of	  tax	  revenues,	  jobs,	  and	  economic	  output,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  New	  York’s	  decision	  to	  implement	  a	  nuclear	  subsidy	  is	  both	  financially	  sound	  and	  profitable.	  	  	  
3.3.2	  Emissions	  Abatement	  	   The	  ability	  of	  nuclear	  technology	  to	  generate	  electricity	  without	  the	  resultant	  carbon	  emissions	  associated	  with	  traditional	  forms	  of	  energy	  production	  is	  another	  important	  factor	  in	  New	  York’s	  decision	  to	  preserve	  its	  upstate	  nuclear	  generation.	  As	  upstate	  nuclear	  accounts	  for	  over	  thirty-­‐‑seven	  percent	  of	  carbon-­‐‑free	  electricity	  generation	  in	  New	  York,	  avoiding	  around	  sixteen	  million	  tons	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  (CO2)	  emissions	  annually,	  preserving	  it	  is	  a	  crucial	  step	  in	  achieving	  the	  states	  aggressive	  emissions	  reduction	  goals	  outlined	  in	  the	  SEP	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2015A;	  Berkman	  &	  Murphy,	  2015).	  By	  maintaining	  the	  CO2	  savings	  provided	  by	  these	  plants,	  the	  state	  will	  be	  able	  to	  pursue	  further	  emissions	  reduction	  through	  expansion	  of	  renewables	  and	  energy	  efficiency.	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The	  importance	  of	  nuclear	  generation	  in	  limiting	  CO2	  emissions,	  and	  the	  challenges	  in	  replacing	  its	  carbon-­‐‑free	  generation	  when	  lost,	  can	  be	  displayed	  through	  the	  emission-­‐‑related	  concerns	  surrounding	  the	  closure	  of	  Indian	  Point.	  As	  Indian	  Point	  is	  the	  single	  largest	  provider	  of	  carbon-­‐‑free	  generation	  in	  the	  state,	  providing	  over	  two	  gigawatts	  of	  electricity	  annually,	  replacing	  its	  power	  to	  the	  New	  York	  metropolitan	  area	  without	  increasing	  CO2	  emissions	  will	  require	  “a	  combination	  of	  energy	  efficiency,	  demand	  response	  programs	  and	  new	  high-­‐‑voltage	  transmission	  infrastructure	  that	  will	  bring	  new	  and	  existing	  renewable	  energy	  resources”	  (Anderson,	  2017;	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2015A).	  Along	  with	  the	  state’s	  aforementioned	  commitment	  to	  over	  two	  gigawatts	  of	  offshore	  wind	  by	  2030,	  an	  additional	  renewables	  project	  expected	  to	  be	  a	  major	  part	  of	  this	  energy	  replacement	  solution	  is	  the	  Champlain	  Hudson	  Power	  Express,	  a	  two	  billion	  dollar	  venture	  that	  would	  bring	  one	  gigawatt	  of	  hydropower	  from	  Quebec	  to	  New	  York	  City	  via	  high	  voltage	  transmission	  lines	  by	  its	  expected	  completion	  date	  of	  2021,	  effectively	  replacing	  about	  half	  of	  Indian	  Point’s	  generation	  with	  renewables	  (St.	  John,	  2017;	  Anderson,	  2017).	  Wider	  initiatives,	  such	  as	  NY-­‐‑Sun,	  which	  seeks	  to	  add	  three	  gigawatts	  of	  solar	  power	  by	  2023,	  will	  play	  a	  smaller	  role	  in	  this	  replacement,	  as	  the	  generation	  will	  be	  spread	  across	  the	  state,	  while	  smaller,	  locally	  significant	  demand-­‐‑side	  projects,	  such	  as	  energy	  efficiency,	  demand	  response,	  and	  on-­‐‑site	  generation	  will	  be	  comparably	  significant	  (St.	  John,	  2017).	  	  While	  New	  York’s	  commitment	  toward	  renewable	  development	  and	  demand-­‐‑side	  improvements	  creates	  an	  optimistic	  outlook,	  the	  timeliness	  and	  proper	  execution	  of	  such	  projects	  is	  vital	  in	  ensuring	  that	  Indian	  Point’s	  generation	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is	  replaced	  without	  increasing	  CO2	  emissions.	  The	  failure	  to	  achieve	  this	  task	  would	  have	  grave	  consequences	  in	  terms	  of	  state	  emissions	  levels.	  Such	  a	  predicament	  is	  currently	  being	  experienced	  in	  New	  England	  due	  to	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  Vermont	  Yankee	  nuclear	  facility,	  with	  ISO-­‐‑NE	  experiencing	  an	  increase	  of	  about	  twenty	  pounds	  of	  CO2	  per	  MWh	  generated	  between	  2014	  and	  2015	  as	  the	  regional	  generation	  void	  left	  by	  nuclear	  is	  being	  filled	  by	  natural	  gas	  (Walton,	  2017).	  This	  misfortune	  shows	  that	  Indian	  Point’s	  closure	  “puts	  pressure	  on	  New	  York	  to	  find	  carbon-­‐‑neutral	  alternatives	  to	  replace	  nuclear	  generation	  in	  the	  next	  five	  years”	  (St.	  John,	  2017).	  	  Beyond	  the	  potential	  for	  increased	  CO2	  emissions,	  Indian	  Point’s	  closure	  has	  resulted	  in	  an	  unfortunate	  situation	  for	  New	  York,	  where	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  the	  efforts,	  funding,	  and	  resources	  that	  could	  be	  contributing	  toward	  reducing	  statewide	  emissions	  are	  instead	  being	  used	  to	  ensure	  that	  emissions	  levels	  do	  not	  rise.	  If	  this	  situation	  were	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  closure	  of	  upstate	  nuclear	  facilities,	  New	  York	  would	  undoubtedly	  have	  a	  tougher	  time	  in	  decreasing	  or	  maintaining	  its	  overall	  emissions	  levels.	  However,	  the	  preservation	  of	  upstate	  nuclear	  facilities	  will	  avoid	  such	  an	  issue,	  allowing	  the	  state	  to	  pursue	  its	  aggressive	  emissions	  targets.	  This	  rationale	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  CES	  Order	  itself,	  when	  stating	  that	  the	  nuclear	  subsidization	  program	  “has	  the	  considerable	  benefit	  of	  ensuring	  that	  the	  zero-­‐‑emissions	  attributes	  will	  be	  preserved	  for	  a	  considerable	  period	  of	  time	  to	  give	  the	  RES	  program	  an	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  new	  renewable	  resources	  on	  a	  scale	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  backsliding	  on	  carbon	  emissions”	  (NYS	  PSC,	  2016).	  A	  similar	  sentiment	  has	  been	  voiced	  by	  the	  Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute	  when	  pointing	  out	  that	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even	  the	  shutdown	  of	  the	  state’s	  smallest	  nuclear	  facility,	  Ginna,	  “would	  undo	  all	  of	  the	  renewables	  investment	  made	  by	  New	  York	  in	  the	  past	  decade”	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2015B).	  	  An	  additional	  quality	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  worth	  mentioning	  is	  its	  prevention	  of	  increased	  emission	  of	  “criteria	  pollutants”,	  such	  as	  sulfur	  dioxide	  (SO2),	  nitrous	  oxide	  (NOx),	  and	  particulate	  matter	  (PM),	  whose	  impacts	  are	  often	  regional	  because	  air	  pollution	  impacts	  can	  cross	  state	  borders”	  (Berkman	  &	  Murphy,	  2015).	  Annually,	  New	  York’s	  upstate	  facilities	  are	  estimated	  to	  prevent	  the	  emission	  of	  over	  three	  thousand	  tons	  of	  SO2,	  over	  thirteen	  thousand	  tons	  of	  NOx,	  and	  over	  two	  thousand	  tons	  of	  PM	  from	  the	  state	  power	  sector	  (Berkman	  &	  Murphy,	  2015).	  	  	  
3.4	  ZEC	  Pricing	  and	  Facility	  Impact	  	  	   By	  obligating	  all	  LSEs	  to	  purchase	  ZECs,	  the	  CES	  ensures	  financial	  backing	  of	  upstate	  nuclear	  to	  preserve	  its	  operation	  for	  the	  next	  several	  years.	  Over	  its	  twelve-­‐‑year	  duration,	  spanning	  from	  2017	  to	  2029,	  the	  program	  is	  estimated	  to	  direct	  7.6	  billion	  dollars	  to	  upstate	  nuclear	  facilities	  (Klepper,	  2017).	  Exploring	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  ZEC	  program	  and	  the	  financial	  structure	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  operations	  will	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  estimated	  cost	  and	  its	  foreseeable	  impact	  of	  these	  upstate	  facilities.	  	  	   Over	  its	  twelve-­‐‑year	  span,	  the	  ZEC	  program	  is	  segmented	  into	  six	  two-­‐‑year	  segments,	  called	  tranches.	  The	  ZEC	  price,	  which	  is	  initially	  set	  for	  “Tranche	  1”	  at	  $17.48,	  will	  be	  adjusted	  every	  two	  years	  for	  Tranches	  2	  through	  6	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  established	  pricing	  formula	  for	  ZECs.	  ZEC	  price-­‐‑setting	  methodology	  takes	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into	  account	  three	  components:	  the	  social	  cost	  of	  carbon	  (SCC),	  benefits	  received	  from	  the	  Regional	  Greenhouse	  Gas	  Initiative	  (RGGI),	  and	  the	  amount	  by	  which	  the	  sum	  of	  New	  York’s	  Zone	  A	  Forecast	  Energy	  Price	  and	  Rest	  of	  State	  (ROS)	  Forecast	  Capacity	  Price	  exceeds	  $39	  per	  MWh.	  The	  ZEC	  price	  formula	  using	  these	  factors	  is	  displayed	  below	  (Figure	  18).	  	  	  
Figure	  18:	  ZEC	  Price	  Formula	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  NYPSC,	  2016	  	   	  Basing	  the	  ZEC	  price	  on	  SCC,	  which	  “is	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  economic	  damages	  associated	  with	  a	  small	  increase	  in	  carbon	  dioxide	  emissions,	  conventionally	  one	  metric	  ton,	  in	  a	  given	  year”,	  links	  the	  financial	  support	  of	  nuclear	  facilities	  to	  their	  carbon-­‐‑abating	  attribute	  (EPA,	  2015B).	  The	  values	  used	  in	  the	  ZEC	  formula	  were	  adopted	  from	  an	  analysis	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Interagency	  Working	  Group,	  which	  has	  been	  used	  in	  numerous	  state	  and	  federal	  rulemakings	  since	  its	  publication	  in	  July	  2015	  (EPA,	  2015B).	  The	  SCC	  values	  for	  each	  tranche,	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  19,	  are	  an	  average	  of	  the	  projected	  SCC	  for	  its	  respective	  time	  frame.	  For	  example,	  Tranche	  1	  will	  run	  from	  April	  1,	  2017	  to	  March	  31,	  2019,	  so	  the	  SCC	  value	  used	  for	  this	  period	  is	  the	  projected	  average	  SCC	  for	  April	  2017	  through	  March	  2019	  (NYPSC,	  2016).	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Figure	  19:	  ZEC	  Pricing	  Components	  per	  Tranche	  Tranche	  Number	   SCC	   RGGI	   ZEC	  Price	  (prior	  to	  Zone	  A	  &	  ROS	  forecast	  subtraction)	  	  1	   $42.87	   $10.41	   $32.46	  2	   $46.79	   $10.41	   $36.38	  3	   $50.11	   $10.41	   $39.70	  4	   $54.66	   $10.41	   $44.25	  5	   $59.54	   $10.41	   $49.13	  6	   $64.54	   $10.41	   $54.13	  Source:	  NYPSC,	  2016	  	   The	  subtraction	  of	  effects	  from	  RGGI,	  a	  mandatory	  cap-­‐‑and-­‐‑trade	  based	  program	  for	  CO2	  emissions	  across	  a	  coalition	  of	  nine	  Northeastern	  and	  Mid-­‐‑Atlantic	  states,	  including	  New	  York,	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  nuclear	  facilities	  already	  receive	  some	  SCC-­‐‑based	  benefits	  due	  to	  this	  program.	  In	  RGGI	  states,	  CO2	  emissions	  allowances	  are	  distributed	  to	  power	  plants,	  which	  enables	  nuclear	  facilities	  to	  sell	  their	  allowances	  and	  benefit	  due	  to	  their	  emission-­‐‑free	  generation.	  The	  value	  assigned	  to	  this	  baseline	  RGGI	  price	  of	  $10.41,	  which	  will	  remain	  constant	  across	  all	  tranches,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  average	  forecasted	  RGGI	  allowance	  prices	  embedded	  in	  the	  Congestion	  Assessment	  and	  Resource	  Integration	  Study	  Phase	  1	  Report	  for	  April	  2017	  through	  March	  2019	  (NYPSC,	  2019).	  	   The	  second	  subtraction	  of	  the	  ZEC	  price	  formula	  accounts	  for	  the	  revenues	  received	  by	  nuclear	  facilities	  for	  selling	  power	  to	  wholesale	  markets	  and	  “the	  change	  in	  forecasts	  over	  time”	  of	  energy	  market	  prices	  (NYPSC,	  2016).	  The	  value	  of	  this	  variable	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  amount	  that	  the	  sum	  of	  forecasted	  energy	  prices	  in	  NYISO	  Zone	  A	  and	  forecasted	  NYISO	  Rest	  of	  State	  capacity	  prices	  exceed	  thirty-­‐‑nine	  dollars	  per	  megawatt	  hour.	  The	  thirty-­‐‑nine	  dollar	  baseline	  value	  is	  an	  average	  of	  a	  forecast	  done	  by	  Intercontinental	  Exchange	  of	  NYISO	  Zone	  A	  energy	  prices	  from	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April	  2017	  through	  March	  2019	  and	  a	  forecast	  done	  by	  New	  York	  Mercantile	  Exchange	  of	  NYISO	  ROS	  Capacity	  for	  April	  2017	  through	  March	  2018,	  which	  represents	  “a	  forecast	  for	  long-­‐‑term	  avoided	  power	  costs”	  (Walton,	  2017;	  NYPSC,	  2016).	  Although	  the	  upstate	  nuclear	  facilities	  are	  located	  in	  NYISO	  Zone	  B	  and	  C,	  Zone	  A	  and	  ROS	  are	  used	  as	  proxies	  for	  market	  conditions	  in	  this	  variable	  due	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  provide	  “liquidity	  and	  available	  data”	  and	  because	  “the	  same	  quality	  of	  independent	  forecasts	  is	  not	  available	  in	  Zones	  B	  and	  C”	  (NYPSC,	  2016).	  	  	   Additionally,	  a	  total	  maximum	  cap	  of	  27,618,000	  credits	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  ZECs	  annually.	  This	  figure	  is	  based	  on	  the	  MWh	  generation	  output	  of	  upstate	  nuclear	  facilities	  over	  the	  period	  of	  July	  2015	  through	  June	  2016,	  as	  this	  was	  the	  most	  recent	  12-­‐‑month	  production	  period	  during	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  ZEC	  price	  formula,	  making	  it	  the	  most	  practical	  estimate	  of	  their	  future	  annual	  generation.	  As	  one	  MWh	  of	  generation	  produces	  one	  ZEC	  credit	  with	  a	  value	  of	  $17.48	  during	  Tranche	  1,	  the	  total	  revenue	  received	  by	  these	  facilities	  through	  ZEC	  sales	  during	  this	  period	  will	  total	  to	  $965,525,280,	  assuming	  consistency	  in	  their	  generation	  output.	  	  	   Due	  to	  costs	  administrative	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  ZEC	  program,	  an	  additional	  $0.0594	  will	  be	  added	  to	  the	  price	  of	  each	  ZEC	  (NYPSC,	  2016B).	  This	  adder	  was	  determined	  by	  the	  estimated	  overhead	  and	  salary	  costs	  to	  be	  incurred	  by	  NYSERDA	  divided	  by	  the	  maximum	  number	  of	  credits	  to	  be	  sold	  during	  the	  first	  tranche	  of	  the	  program.	  While	  LSEs	  will	  bear	  this	  additional	  cost,	  payments	  received	  by	  nuclear	  facilities	  for	  the	  sale	  of	  ZECs	  will	  remain	  at	  the	  amount	  calculated	  by	  the	  original	  pricing	  formula.	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   Due	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  factors	  that	  have	  driven	  down	  wholesale	  electricity	  prices	  in	  New	  York,	  the	  state	  experienced	  the	  lowest	  wholesale	  electricity	  market	  prices	  in	  its	  history,	  averaging	  44.09	  dollars	  per	  MWh	  (NYISO,	  2016).	  The	  average	  total	  generating	  costs	  for	  single-­‐‑reactor	  nuclear	  facilities	  in	  the	  United	  States	  exceeding	  this	  price	  at	  an	  estimated	  44.52	  per	  MWh	  suggests	  that	  New	  York’s	  upstate	  nuclear	  facilities	  have	  been	  recently	  operating	  under	  negative	  profit	  margins	  (Nuclear	  Energy	  Institute,	  2016B).	  The	  exceptional	  seniority	  of	  these	  facilities	  has	  worsened	  this	  situation	  due	  to	  the	  significant	  maintenance	  measures	  necessary	  for	  their	  continued	  operation.	  For	  example,	  at	  Fitzpatrick,	  which	  has	  been	  operating	  for	  more	  than	  forty	  years,	  “Entergy	  recently	  spent	  millions	  of	  dollars	  replacing	  tubes	  in	  the	  main	  condenser	  at	  Fitzpatrick,	  and	  the	  company	  faces	  other	  required	  upgrades	  if	  it	  wants	  to	  keep	  operating	  the	  reactor”	  (Nuclear	  Information	  and	  Resource	  Center;	  Alliance	  for	  a	  Green	  Economy,	  2015).	  From	  this,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  ZEC	  program	  is	  necessary	  in	  enabling	  these	  facilities	  to	  undergo	  upgrades	  and	  remain	  financially	  adequate	  in	  increasingly	  competitive	  markets.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








	   This	  chapter	  explores	  the	  legal	  discourse	  surrounding	  New	  York’s	  subsidization	  of	  nuclear	  facilities,	  specifically	  regarding	  the	  jurisdictional	  authority	  of	  states	  in	  influencing	  wholesale	  power	  markets.	  This	  discussion	  will	  explore	  a	  prior	  legal	  conflict	  surrounding	  state	  manipulation	  of	  wholesale	  markets	  and	  its	  relevant	  legislation	  to	  assist	  in	  understanding	  the	  argument	  against,	  and	  New	  York’s	  defense	  of,	  the	  ZEC	  program.	  The	  legal	  precedent	  set	  by	  this	  program,	  particularly	  through	  its	  use	  of	  SCC,	  will	  be	  of	  particular	  interest	  as	  it	  stands	  to	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  nuclear	  generation	  across	  deregulated	  markets.	  Analyzing	  more	  recent	  programs	  supporting	  nuclear	  facilities	  in	  other	  deregulated	  states,	  such	  as	  Illinois	  and	  Connecticut,	  will	  serve	  to	  show	  how	  the	  precedent	  set	  by	  New	  York’s	  subsidization	  has	  externally	  impacted	  state	  energy	  policy.	  	  	  	  
4.2	  ZEC	  Litigation	  	   As	  previously	  mentioned	  when	  discussing	  power	  market	  structure	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  jurisdiction	  over	  power	  markets	  is	  split	  between	  federal	  and	  state	  entities,	  with	  FERC	  administering	  federal	  oversight	  of	  wholesale	  markets,	  and	  state	  PSCs	  controlling	  their	  respective	  retail	  markets.	  Due	  to	  the	  ZEC	  program’s	  design	  of	  assisting	  nuclear	  facilities	  through	  state-­‐‑ordered	  payments	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  base	  load	  nuclear	  generation	  in	  the	  NYISO	  market,	  the	  NYPSC	  was	  accused	  of	  infringing	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on	  FERC’s	  jurisdiction	  on	  interstate	  wholesale	  markets.	  While	  the	  power	  sold	  into	  NYISO	  is	  only	  sold	  within	  New	  York,	  its	  auctions	  are	  considered	  interstate	  wholesale	  markets,	  as	  some	  of	  the	  generators	  bidding	  into	  the	  PX	  are	  located	  outside	  of	  state	  borders	  (U.S.	  District	  Court,	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	  2016B).	  On	  October	  19,	  2016,	  this	  accusation	  materialized	  through	  Coalition	  for	  Competitive	  Electricity,	  et	  al.	  
v.	  Audrey	  Zibelman,	  in	  her	  official	  capacity	  as	  Chair	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Public	  Service	  
Commission	  et	  al.	  (CCE	  v.	  Zibelman),	  a	  lawsuit	  filed	  in	  the	  U.S.	  District	  Court	  for	  the	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York	  against	  the	  NYPSC	  by	  a	  coalition	  of	  IPPS	  that	  was	  formed	  to	  combat	  the	  ZEC	  program	  (Anderson,	  2016;	  U.S.	  District	  Court,	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	  2016A).	  In	  its	  opening	  statement,	  the	  lawsuit	  asserts	  that	  the	  ZEC	  program	  “invades	  FERC’s	  ‘regulatory	  turf’	  by	  ‘adjusting	  an	  interstate	  wholesale	  rate’	  with	  a	  price	  supplement	  to	  a	  favored	  generator…	  and	  should	  be	  deemed	  unconstitutional”	  (U.S.	  District	  Court,	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	  2016A).	  Through	  this,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  CCE,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  this	  lawsuit,	  charged	  that	  the	  NYPSC	  overstepped	  its	  jurisdictional	  authority	  by	  adjusting	  wholesale	  rates	  through	  preventing	  base	  load	  nuclear	  to	  be	  competitively	  priced	  out	  of	  the	  market,	  therefore	  compromising	  its	  true	  competitiveness.	  Before	  delving	  into	  the	  specifics	  of	  this	  lawsuit	  and	  case,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  first	  view	  another	  hallmark	  ruling	  that	  has	  largely	  shaped	  the	  legal	  space	  with	  which	  it	  concerns.	  	  	  	  
4.2.1	  Hughes	  v.	  Talen	  	   In	  2011,	  due	  worries	  that	  its	  lack	  of	  in-­‐‑state	  generation	  capacity	  was	  putting	  the	  reliability	  of	  its	  power	  grid	  at	  risk,	  Maryland	  underwent	  an	  effort	  to	  promote	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development	  of	  new	  in-­‐‑state	  power	  plants	  (Farmer,	  2016).	  To	  do	  so,	  the	  Maryland	  Public	  Service	  Commission	  (MDPSC),	  sought	  out	  proposals	  for	  a	  new	  natural-­‐‑gas	  power	  plant,	  eventually	  selecting	  Competitive	  Power	  Ventures	  (CPV)	  to	  construct	  a	  661	  MW	  facility	  (Farmer,	  2016).	  	  In	  order	  to	  solicit	  interest	  from	  developers,	  due	  to	  concerns	  that	  wholesale	  electricity	  prices	  in	  the	  PJM	  Interconnection,	  the	  RTO	  that	  serves	  Maryland	  and	  several	  other	  states,	  were	  “failing	  to	  encourage	  development	  of	  sufficient	  new	  in-­‐‑state	  generation”,	  MDPSC	  proposed	  a	  program	  to	  make	  such	  a	  development	  more	  financially	  attractive	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  2016).	  In	  this	  program,	  MDPSC	  would	  require	  all	  LSEs	  operating	  in	  Maryland	  to	  enter	  twenty-­‐‑year	  pricing	  contracts	  with	  CPV	  at	  a	  price	  specified	  in	  the	  CPV	  proposal.	  With	  these	  contracts,	  CPV	  would	  sell	  its	  capacity	  into	  PJM	  through	  the	  PX,	  but	  would	  receive	  the	  contract	  price	  rather	  than	  the	  MCP	  “through	  mandated	  payments	  from	  or	  to	  LSEs”	  to	  make	  up	  the	  difference,	  the	  costs	  of	  which	  would	  be	  recovered	  through	  ratepayer	  bills	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  2016).	  	  Due	  to	  the	  adverse	  impact	  that	  this	  program	  stood	  to	  have	  on	  their	  earnings,	  a	  group	  of	  incumbent	  generators	  filed	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  MDPSC	  in	  the	  Maryland	  District	  Court.	  The	  lawsuit,	  Hughes,	  Chairman,	  Maryland	  Public	  Service	  Commision,	  et	  
al.	  v.	  Talen	  Energy	  Marketing	  LLC,	  FKA	  PPL	  EnergyPlus,	  LLC,	  et	  al.	  (Hughes	  v.	  Talen),	  claimed	  that	  the	  program	  “intruded	  into	  FERC’s	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  over	  wholesale	  energy	  markets”,	  and	  was	  therefore	  unlawful	  (Farmer,	  2016).	  After	  the	  District	  Court	  ruled	  that	  the	  program	  was	  unlawful	  on	  these	  grounds,	  a	  decision	  that	  was	  upheld	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  for	  the	  Fourth	  Circuit,	  the	  case	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was	  brought	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  February	  2016	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  2016).	  	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision,	  delivered	  on	  April	  19,	  2016,	  upheld	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  lower	  courts	  in	  an	  eight	  to	  zero	  vote	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  2016).	  This	  touchstone	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  was	  the	  Federal	  Power	  Act,	  specifically	  the	  Act’s	  decree	  that	  FERC	  is	  responsible	  in	  ensuring	  that	  “all	  rates	  and	  charges	  made,	  demanded,	  or	  received	  by	  any	  public	  utility	  for	  or	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  transmission	  or	  sale	  of	  electric	  energy	  subject	  to	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Commission…	  shall	  be	  just	  and	  reasonable,	  and	  any	  such	  rate	  or	  charge	  that	  is	  not	  just	  and	  reasonable	  is	  hereby	  declared	  to	  be	  unlawful”	  (Federal	  Power	  Act,	  2015).	  In	  its	  decision,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  pointed	  to	  this	  statute,	  stating	  that	  Maryland	  “has	  acted	  to	  guarantee	  CPV	  a	  rate	  different	  than	  FERC’s	  ‘just	  and	  reasonable’	  rate	  and	  has	  thus	  contrived	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Federal	  Power	  Act”	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  2016).	  Through	  this,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  MDPSC,	  by	  guaranteeing	  contract	  prices	  to	  CPV	  and	  encouraging	  full	  participation	  of	  its	  new	  natural-­‐‑gas	  facility	  in	  the	  PX	  regardless	  of	  MCP,	  is	  altering	  wholesale	  prices	  governed	  by	  FERC	  and	  was	  deemed	  unlawful	  because	  of	  it.	  	  In	  concluding	  its	  decision,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  added	  clarification	  that	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  legal	  debate	  surrounding	  New	  York’s	  ZEC	  program,	  in	  stating,	  “our	  holding	  is	  limited…	  we	  need	  not	  and	  do	  not	  address	  the	  permissibility	  of	  various	  other	  measures	  States	  might	  employ	  to	  encourage	  development	  of	  new	  or	  clean	  generation…	  through	  measures	  ‘untethered	  to	  a	  generator’s	  wholesale	  market	  participation’”	  (Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  2016).	  The	  vagueness	  of	  this	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conclusion	  poses	  difficulties	  in	  defining	  which	  state	  measures	  are	  truly	  “untethered”	  to	  wholesale	  market	  participation,	  making	  the	  relationship	  between	  ZEC	  prices	  and	  the	  market	  participation	  of	  the	  nuclear	  facilities	  receiving	  them	  paramount	  to	  determining	  the	  programs	  legitimacy.	  	  	  
4.2.2	  Legal	  Defense	  of	  ZECs	  Despite	  the	  accusations	  made	  against	  its	  lawfulness,	  the	  ZEC	  program	  is	  “carefully	  designed	  not	  to	  conflict	  with	  Federal	  jurisdiction”	  through	  the	  methodology	  by	  which	  ZEC	  prices	  are	  determined	  and	  how	  their	  pricing	  formula	  reflects	  the	  overall	  intent	  of	  the	  program	  (Barber,	  2016).	  In	  this	  formula,	  which	  was	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  SCC	  is	  used	  as	  the	  baseline	  value	  for	  which	  ZEC	  prices	  are	  determined.	  By	  primarily	  using	  SCC	  to	  valuate	  ZECs,	  the	  formula	  establishes	  that	  “they	  are	  credits	  reflecting	  the	  environmental	  attributes	  associated	  with	  the	  production	  of	  energy	  using	  particular	  technology...	  that	  are	  not	  valued	  by	  market	  revenues,	  to	  induce	  the	  generators	  to	  continue	  to	  produce	  those	  attributes	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  customers”	  (NYPSC,	  2016C).	  Proving	  that	  ZEC	  prices	  are	  determined	  by	  their	  emission-­‐‑related	  attributes	  displays	  that	  the	  ZEC	  program	  was	  created	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  achieving	  the	  statewide	  emissions	  reduction	  mandated	  by	  the	  SEP,	  which	  is	  crucial	  in	  supporting	  its	  legality	  as	  preservation	  of	  the	  environment	  and	  public	  health,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  improved	  through	  reduced	  emissions,	  is	  delegated	  to	  NYPSC	  through	  New	  York	  Public	  Service	  Law	  (PSL)	  (NYPSC,	  2016C).	  	  The	  specific	  clause	  that	  gives	  NYPSC	  its	  environmental	  authority	  states,	  “the	  commission	  shall	  encourage	  all	  persons	  and	  corporations	  subject	  to	  its	  jurisdiction	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to	  formulate	  and	  carry	  out	  long-­‐‑range	  programs,	  individually	  or	  cooperatively,	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  their	  public	  service	  responsibilities	  with…	  the	  preservation	  of	  environmental	  values	  and	  the	  conservation	  of	  natural	  resources”	  (New	  York	  PSL	  §5).	  This	  law	  makes	  environmentally	  related	  goals	  and	  actions	  related	  to	  them	  “well	  within	  the	  regulatory	  authority	  of	  states”,	  which	  can	  be	  shown	  through	  the	  commonality	  and	  lack	  of	  contention	  against	  renewable	  portfolio	  standards	  across	  the	  United	  States	  (Goldberg,	  2016).	  In	  respect	  to	  public	  health	  and	  the	  electric	  system,	  New	  York’s	  PSL	  also	  gives	  NYPSC	  the	  authority	  “to	  order	  such	  reasonable	  improvements	  as	  will	  best	  promote	  the	  public	  interest,	  preserve	  the	  public	  health	  and	  protect	  those	  using	  gas	  or	  such	  electricity	  (New	  York	  PSL	  §66).	  Through	  these	  established	  laws,	  ZECs	  are	  supported	  by	  NYPSC’s	  duty	  to	  preserve	  aspects	  of	  the	  electric	  system	  that	  promote	  environmental	  and	  public.	  	  	  As	  its	  opponents	  have	  pointed	  out,	  the	  subsidization	  of	  upstate	  nuclear	  generation	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  wholesale	  markets	  by	  preserving	  base	  load	  generation	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  lost.	  However,	  this	  impact	  is	  inherent	  as	  state	  energy	  policy	  of	  any	  kind	  is	  “acting	  concurrently	  with	  respect	  to	  electricity	  markets	  and	  so	  it	  is	  unavoidable	  that	  state	  actions	  will	  impact	  the	  wholesale	  markets”	  (Goldberg,	  2016).	  As	  established	  by	  Hughes	  v.	  Talen,	  such	  consequential	  impacts	  are	  permissible,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  state	  actions	  are	  not	  tethered	  to	  a	  generator’s	  wholesale	  market	  participation.	  This	  decision	  reserved	  a	  range	  of	  options	  for	  states	  to	  pursue	  in	  subsidizing	  existing	  generation	  while	  still	  staying	  in	  their	  own	  jurisdiction,	  with	  valuing	  environmental	  attributes	  being	  one	  of	  these	  options.	  While	  CCE	  v.	  Zibelman	  is	  still	  held	  up	  in	  federal	  court,	  NYPSC’s	  use	  of	  this	  option	  should	  protect	  it	  against	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
62	  
accusations	  of	  infringement	  on	  FERC	  jurisdiction.	  
	  
4.3	  ZEC	  Snowball	  Effect	  	  	   After	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  ZEC	  program,	  several	  other	  states	  wishing	  to	  preserve	  their	  nuclear	  assets	  have	  looked	  toward	  New	  York	  to	  model	  such	  policies	  after.	  These	  states,	  namely	  Illinois,	  Connecticut,	  and	  New	  Jersey,	  are	  at	  various	  stages	  of	  implementing,	  proposing,	  and	  considering	  similar	  legislation	  that	  would	  establish	  state-­‐‑level	  support	  of	  nuclear	  facilities	  in	  a	  way	  similar	  to	  the	  Order	  Adopting	  a	  Clean	  Energy	  Standard.	  As	  these	  states	  are	  comparable	  to	  New	  York	  in	  that	  they	  have	  deregulated	  energy	  markets	  and	  are	  in	  the	  same	  general	  geographic	  region,	  their	  nuclear	  facilities	  are	  facing	  financial	  difficulties	  driven	  by	  similar	  market	  trends	  impacting	  those	  in	  New	  York.	  	  	   In	  Illinois,	  such	  legislation	  occurred	  through	  SB	  2814,	  named	  the	  Future	  Energy	  Jobs	  Bill,	  which	  was	  signed	  into	  law	  on	  December	  7,	  2016	  and	  is	  set	  to	  take	  effect	  on	  June	  1,	  2017	  (Maloney,	  2016).	  The	  large-­‐‑scale	  legislation,	  which	  also	  includes	  initiatives	  to	  promote	  renewables,	  energy	  efficiency,	  and	  low-­‐‑income	  energy	  programs,	  establishes	  a	  subsidy	  program	  that	  provides	  two	  nuclear	  facilities	  owned	  by	  Exelon	  with	  up	  to	  two	  hundred	  thirty-­‐‑five	  million	  dollars	  per	  year	  for	  the	  next	  ten	  years,	  with	  a	  possibility	  of	  renewal	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  program	  (Lyderson,	  2016;	  Maloney,	  2016).	  Like	  those	  in	  New	  York,	  Exelon	  facilities	  in	  Illinois	  have	  been	  negatively	  impacted	  due	  to	  recent	  energy	  market	  trends,	  experiencing	  losses	  over	  the	  past	  seven	  years	  to	  the	  tune	  of	  about	  eight	  hundred	  million	  dollars	  (Maloney,	  2016).	  In	  a	  way	  that	  seemingly	  mimics	  New	  York’s	  legislation,	  the	  Future	  Energy	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Jobs	  bill	  seeks	  to	  assist	  these	  facilities	  in	  establishing	  “zero	  emissions	  credits”,	  defined	  as	  “a	  tradable	  credit	  that	  represents	  the	  environmental	  attributes	  of	  one	  megawatt	  hour	  of	  energy	  produced	  from	  a	  zero	  emission	  facility…	  [which	  is]	  a	  facility	  that	  is	  fueled	  by	  nuclear	  power”	  (Rita,	  2016).	  The	  similarity	  in	  their	  designs	  shows	  that	  “the	  DNA	  of	  the	  Illinois	  law	  is	  the	  New	  York	  Clean	  Energy	  Standard”,	  as	  both	  use	  environmental	  attributes	  of	  nuclear	  generation	  to	  carefully	  avoid	  intrusion	  into	  FERC	  jurisdiction	  over	  wholesale	  markets	  (Maloney,	  2016).	  	  Also	  similar	  to	  New	  York’s	  CES,	  the	  Illinois	  legislation	  is	  involved	  in	  a	  federal	  lawsuit	  due	  to	  its	  nuclear	  subsidization	  component.	  The	  lawsuit,	  which	  was	  filed	  on	  February	  14,	  2017	  in	  U.S.	  District	  Court	  in	  Chicago	  by	  a	  group	  of	  competing	  power	  companies	  and	  coalitions,	  charges	  that	  the	  law	  “intrudes	  on	  federal	  authority	  to	  regulate	  wholesale	  energy	  prices”	  (Marotti,	  2017).	  Due	  to	  their	  similar	  design,	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  legal	  outcome	  of	  the	  CES	  will	  foreshadow	  that	  of	  the	  Future	  Energy	  Jobs	  bill,	  making	  it	  so	  that	  “if	  New	  York	  stands,	  they	  all	  stand;	  if	  New	  York	  fails,	  they	  all	  fail”	  (Maloney,	  2016).	  Connecticut	  legislators	  are	  currently	  drafting	  a	  bill,	  SB	  106,	  which	  seeks	  to	  make	  nuclear	  energy	  eligible	  to	  receive	  the	  same	  payments	  as	  renewables	  for	  their	  carbon-­‐‑free	  attributes	  (Maloney,	  2017).	  These	  payments	  would	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  RECs	  that	  were	  already	  established	  in	  the	  state’s	  RPS,	  which	  has	  the	  goal	  of	  reaching	  twenty	  percent	  carbon-­‐‑free	  electricity	  generation	  by	  2020,	  and	  works	  similarly	  to	  that	  of	  New	  York	  in	  that	  it	  requires	  “electric	  providers	  to	  obtain	  a	  specified	  percentage	  or	  amount	  of	  the	  energy	  they	  generate	  or	  sell	  from	  renewable	  sources”	  (DEEP,	  2016).	  In	  order	  to	  make	  nuclear	  eligible	  for	  REC	  payments,	  SB	  106	  seeks	  to	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classify	  nuclear	  power	  as	  a	  “Class	  I	  renewable	  energy	  resource”,	  putting	  in	  the	  same	  category	  as	  solar,	  wind,	  hydroelectric,	  geothermal,	  wave,	  tidal,	  biomass,	  and	  other	  generation	  sources	  (Maloney,	  2017;	  DEEP,	  2016).	  	  While	  not	  specified	  by	  law,	  the	  single	  beneficiary	  of	  this	  bill	  would	  be	  the	  Milestone	  Nuclear	  Power	  Station,	  which	  is	  owned	  by	  Dominion	  Energy,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  state’s	  only	  nuclear	  facility.	  As	  Milestone	  alone	  accounts	  for	  about	  ninety-­‐‑eight	  percent	  of	  Connecticut’s	  carbon-­‐‑free	  electricity	  and	  about	  forty-­‐‑six	  percent	  of	  Connecticut’s	  total	  electricity,	  Connecticut	  lawmaker’s	  will	  likely	  make	  the	  argument	  that	  SB	  106	  is	  necessary	  in	  ensuring	  that	  the	  state’s	  RPS	  and	  is	  achieved	  and	  that	  its	  electric	  system	  remains	  reliable	  (Dominion	  Energy,	  2017;	  Maloney,	  2017).	  While	  Milestone	  is	  still	  operating	  profitably,	  recent	  decreases	  in	  its	  revenue	  are	  creating	  concern	  over	  its	  future	  market	  performance	  (Maloney,	  2017).	  This	  sentiment	  is	  best	  summarized	  by	  Senator	  Paul	  Formica,	  one	  of	  the	  sponsors	  of	  SB	  106,	  when	  stating,	  “We	  know	  the	  nuclear	  industry	  has	  problems	  around	  the	  country.	  Do	  we	  want	  to	  wait	  until	  it’s	  a	  huge	  problem	  in	  front	  of	  our	  noses,	  or	  do	  we	  want	  to	  solve	  it	  ahead	  of	  time?”	  (Dominion	  Energy,	  2017).	  	  New	  Jersey,	  which	  receives	  about	  half	  of	  its	  electricity	  from	  three	  nuclear	  facilities,	  is	  also	  showing	  signs	  of	  interest	  in	  nuclear	  subsidization	  (Johnson,	  2017).	  While	  these	  facilities	  are	  still	  profitable	  despite	  current	  market	  trends,	  PSEG,	  which	  owns	  and	  operates	  them,	  has	  reportedly	  been	  “having	  extensive	  discussions”	  with	  lawmakers	  about	  financial	  incentives	  to	  protect	  the	  facilities	  due	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  such	  profitability	  will	  not	  last	  if	  market	  trends	  persist	  (Johnson,	  2017).	  PSEG’s	  concerns	  with	  this	  matter	  can	  be	  summarized	  by	  their	  communications	  director,	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Kathy	  Fitzgerald,	  who	  stated,	  “If	  that	  trend	  continues	  or	  worsens,	  our	  nuclear	  plants	  could	  cease	  being	  economically	  competitive	  which	  may	  cause	  us	  to	  retire	  such	  units	  prior	  to	  the	  end	  of	  their	  useful	  lives.	  It’s	  important	  to	  get	  ahead	  of	  the	  issue	  here	  in	  New	  Jersey	  before	  we	  reach	  the	  point	  of	  no	  return”	  (Giambusso,	  2016).	  	  FirstEnergy,	  which	  owns	  two	  nuclear	  facilities	  in	  Ohio	  and	  one	  in	  Pennsylvania,	  has	  also	  expressed	  corporate	  interest	  for	  state	  regulators	  to	  support	  their	  nuclear	  fleet.	  In	  Ohio,	  these	  two	  struggling	  facilities	  account	  for	  about	  ninety	  percent	  of	  the	  state’s	  emission-­‐‑free	  electricity	  and	  about	  eleven	  percent	  of	  total	  electricity	  generation	  (Kowalski,	  2017).	  A	  similar	  situation	  is	  being	  experienced	  at	  Beaver	  Valley,	  FirstEnergy’s	  Pennsylvania	  facility,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  five	  nuclear	  facilities	  in	  the	  state	  that	  account	  for	  about	  a	  third	  of	  its	  electricity	  generation	  (EIA,	  2017).	  The	  president	  and	  CEO	  of	  FirstEnergy	  announced	  in	  early	  March	  2017	  that	  a	  bill	  to	  implement	  a	  “Zero-­‐‑Emission	  Nuclear”	  program	  “will	  be	  introduced	  soon”	  to	  the	  Ohio	  state	  legislature	  (Kowalski,	  2017).	  While	  no	  such	  action	  has	  been	  announced	  for	  Pennsylvania,	  a	  spokesperson	  for	  FirstEnergy,	  Jennifer	  Young,	  has	  stated,	  “we	  are	  closely	  following	  developments	  related	  to	  the	  CES	  [in	  New	  York]	  as	  we	  consider	  what	  might	  be	  appropriate	  for	  Beaver	  Valley”	  (Litvak,	  2016).	  	  While	  the	  anatomy	  and	  success	  of	  legislation	  to	  promote	  nuclear	  generation	  remains	  uncertain	  in	  New	  Jersey,	  Pennsylvania,	  and	  Ohio,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  New	  York’s	  ZEC	  program	  has	  motivated	  other	  corporations	  to	  seek	  assistance	  for	  their	  nuclear	  assets	  that	  are	  currently	  or	  are	  likely	  to	  become	  financially	  burdensome.	  Both	  in	  Illinois	  and	  Connecticut,	  signed	  and	  pending	  legislation	  to	  support	  nuclear	  facilities	  also	  shows	  strong	  influence	  from	  New	  York,	  as	  the	  language	  and	  design	  of	  both	  bills	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compensates	  facilities	  for	  their	  emission-­‐‑free	  attributes,	  allowing	  the	  states	  to	  provide	  subsidies	  without	  breaking	  federal-­‐‑state	  jurisdictional	  rules.	  Overall,	  these	  cases	  display	  that	  New	  York’s	  likely	  success	  in	  establishing	  a	  nuclear	  subsidy	  program	  has	  encouraged	  other	  states	  to	  follow	  suit,	  and	  that	  the	  benefits	  to	  Entergy	  in	  New	  York	  have	  created	  momentum	  for	  other	  companies	  to	  pursue	  similar	  legislation	  to	  protect	  their	  nuclear	  assets	  in	  other	  deregulated	  states.	  	  Overall,	  this	  situation	  is	  congruent	  with	  a	  wider	  pattern	  in	  energy	  policy	  development,	  in	  which	  “states	  have	  long	  been	  incubators	  of	  policy	  ideas	  that	  ultimately	  swept	  across	  regions”	  (Rabe,	  2004).	  As	  New	  York’s	  ZEC	  program	  has	  initiated	  similar	  regulatory	  measures	  in	  nearby	  states,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  New	  York,	  through	  this	  novel	  policy,	  has	  become	  the	  incubator	  of	  state-­‐‑level	  subsidization	  of	  nuclear	  energy.	  If	  trends	  within	  energy	  markets	  persist,	  it	  can	  be	  expected	  that	  such	  policies	  will	  be	  of	  growing	  necessity	  to	  preserve	  nuclear	  generation	  in	  deregulated	  states,	  leading	  to	  increased	  adoption	  of	  such	  policies	  in	  these	  states.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  “in	  some	  cases,	  there	  is	  sufficient	  activity	  among	  multiple	  states	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  attempts	  to	  model	  its	  own	  efforts	  after	  earlier	  state	  experiments”,	  and	  that	  this	  pattern	  “has	  only	  intensified	  in	  recent	  decades	  as	  state	  policymaking	  capacity	  has	  risen	  steadily	  alongside	  an	  attendant	  decline	  at	  the	  federal	  level”,	  it	  is	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  New	  York’s	  ZEC	  program	  would	  likely	  be	  the	  model	  of	  federal	  support	  of	  nuclear	  generation	  if	  such	  a	  program	  was	  implemented	  (Rabe,	  2004).	  While	  the	  ZEC	  program’s	  influence	  on	  federal	  policy	  is	  largely	  speculative,	  given	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  energy	  markets	  and	  politicized	  nature	  of	  energy	  policy,	  its	  growing	  influence	  on	  state-­‐‑level	  policy	  is	  displayed	  in	  these	  cases.	  	  




Conclusion	  	  	   Exploring	  New	  York’s	  ZEC	  program	  in	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  policy	  and	  energy	  markets	  provides	  numerous	  insights	  into	  its	  causes,	  purposes,	  and	  implications.	  Through	  this,	  the	  economic	  and	  environmental	  merit,	  regulatory	  legitimacy,	  and	  significance	  toward	  state-­‐‑level	  energy	  policy	  become	  evident.	  New	  York’s	  nuclear	  facilities	  have	  been	  experiencing	  significant	  declines	  in	  profitability	  due	  to	  rising	  trends	  in	  its	  energy	  market.	  These	  trends,	  namely	  increasingly	  inexpensive	  and	  abundant	  natural	  gas	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  the	  expansion	  of	  renewable	  energy	  generation,	  have	  lowered	  wholesale	  electricity	  prices	  and	  consequentially	  lowered	  the	  revenue	  received	  by	  nuclear	  facilities	  for	  their	  base	  load	  electricity	  generation.	  This	  financial	  situation,	  if	  unchanged,	  would	  soon	  force	  the	  closure	  of	  these	  nuclear	  facilities.	  Due	  to	  the	  severe	  harm	  that	  such	  closures	  stand	  to	  have	  on	  upstate	  local	  economies	  and	  mandated	  statewide	  emissions	  reduction	  goals,	  New	  York	  was	  compelled	  to	  preserve	  their	  operations	  for	  economic	  and	  environmental	  reasons.	  While	  upstate	  facilities	  were	  preserved,	  the	  lesser	  economic	  importance	  and	  heightened	  operational	  risk	  of	  the	  single	  downstate	  facility,	  Indian	  Point,	  led	  to	  its	  exclusion	  from	  such	  efforts	  and	  announced	  closure.	  	  Comparing	  the	  estimated	  cost	  of	  subsidizing	  New	  York’s	  upstate	  nuclear	  facilities	  with	  that	  of	  their	  closure,	  which	  accounts	  for	  loss	  of	  tax	  revenues,	  jobs,	  and	  economic	  output,	  shows	  that	  the	  ZEC	  Program	  is	  a	  financially	  responsible	  decision	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  the	  New	  York	  State	  government.	  Additionally,	  the	  considerable	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challenge	  New	  York	  would	  face	  in	  replacing	  upstate	  nuclear	  generation	  without	  increasing	  carbon	  emissions	  can	  be	  displayed	  through	  its	  efforts	  to	  do	  so	  with	  Indian	  Point.	  Through	  this	  example,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  a	  complete	  loss	  of	  nuclear	  generation	  would	  make	  reaching	  the	  aggressive	  emissions	  reduction	  targets	  mandated	  in	  New	  York’s	  SEP	  a	  nearly	  impossible	  task.	  By	  preserving	  much	  of	  its	  emission-­‐‑free	  nuclear	  generation,	  New	  York	  will	  be	  able	  to	  pursue	  these	  targets	  rather	  than	  backslide	  on	  carbon	  emissions.	  	  Through	  this,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  New	  York	  nuclear	  generation	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  bridge	  to	  reach	  a	  renewable-­‐‑dominant	  state	  electricity	  system,	  and	  retaining	  nuclear	  for	  the	  program’s	  duration	  will	  help	  the	  state	  increasingly	  lower	  emissions	  until	  prepared	  to	  live	  without	  it.	  Beyond	  its	  economic	  and	  environmental	  impact	  in	  New	  York,	  the	  ZEC	  program	  stands	  to	  have	  wider	  implications	  for	  state-­‐‑level	  energy	  policy	  due	  to	  its	  carefully	  crafted	  framework.	  Basing	  ZEC	  prices	  primarily	  on	  the	  SCC	  effectively	  establishes	  that	  the	  ZEC	  program	  was	  created	  to	  credit	  nuclear	  facilities	  for	  their	  positive	  environmental	  attributes.	  By	  doing	  so,	  the	  New	  York	  is	  avoiding	  issues	  experienced	  by	  Maryland	  in	  Hughes	  v.	  Talen,	  as	  promotion	  of	  environmental	  quality	  is	  within	  state	  jurisdiction	  and	  is	  untethered	  to	  wholesale	  market	  participation.	  CCE	  v.	  Zibelman	  remains	  in	  federal	  court,	  but	  the	  ZEC’s	  pricing	  structure	  will	  likely	  insulate	  the	  CES	  against	  charges	  related	  to	  encroachment	  on	  federal	  jurisdiction.	  	  While	  still	  under	  challenge,	  the	  presumed	  success	  of	  New	  York	  has	  ushered	  in	  a	  slew	  of	  efforts	  and	  interest	  in	  state-­‐‑level	  nuclear	  subsidy	  programs.	  Additionally,	  the	  similarity	  in	  the	  design	  of	  the	  ZEC	  program	  and	  these	  various	  drafted	  and	  hypothetical	  bills,	  which	  seek	  to	  reward	  nuclear	  power	  for	  its	  emission-­‐‑
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free	  attribute,	  displays	  the	  strong	  influence	  that	  New	  York	  has	  had	  on	  them.	  Most	  notable	  of	  these	  bills	  have	  been	  Illinois’s	  Future	  Energy	  Jobs	  Bill,	  which	  mirrors	  the	  CES	  in	  creating	  zero	  emission	  credits	  for	  nuclear	  facilities,	  and	  Connecticut’s	  proposed	  SB	  106,	  which	  takes	  a	  slightly	  different	  approach	  in	  seeking	  to	  include	  nuclear	  energy	  as	  a	  renewable	  resource	  in	  its	  RPS.	  Other	  instances	  of	  nuclear	  subsidy	  support	  driven	  by	  corporate	  interests,	  seen	  in	  lobbying	  efforts	  in	  New	  Jersey,	  Ohio,	  and	  Pennsylvania,	  can	  be	  attributed	  in	  part	  to	  the	  ZEC	  program	  as	  these	  corporations	  are	  seeking	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  environmental	  attributes	  of	  their	  nuclear	  assets	  the	  same	  way	  Entergy	  stands	  to	  in	  New	  York.	  	  	  
5.1	  Suggestions	  for	  Future	  Work	  	   The	  research	  undertaken	  for	  this	  thesis	  has	  highlighted	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  in	  which	  further	  research	  would	  be	  beneficial.	  One	  major	  topic	  that	  was	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  discussion,	  and	  for	  that	  reason	  was	  largely	  set	  aside,	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  nuclear	  energy	  technology	  to	  have	  an	  adverse	  impact	  on	  environmental	  and	  human	  health.	  A	  discussion	  on	  this	  would	  include	  the	  challenges	  surrounding	  spent	  nuclear	  fuel,	  water	  usage	  of	  nuclear	  facilities	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  local	  waterways	  and	  ecosystems,	  and	  the	  risks	  of	  radiation	  and	  nuclear	  accidents.	  This	  discussion	  would	  also	  benefit	  from	  research	  on	  the	  discrepancies	  between	  societal	  perception	  and	  actual	  prevalence	  of	  these	  impacts.	  Such	  research	  could	  entail	  research	  on	  the	  overall	  politicization	  of	  nuclear	  energy,	  including	  the	  divide	  in	  the	  environmentalist	  movement	  over	  it	  and	  how	  societal	  fears	  over	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  proliferation	  have	  impacted	  its	  public	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approval.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  undecided	  nature	  of	  CCE	  v.	  Zibelman,	  this	  thesis	  would	  benefit	  from	  a	  retroactive	  discussion	  of	  the	  court’s	  ruling,	  paying	  special	  attention	  to	  any	  information	  that	  clarifies	  the	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  between	  FERC	  and	  states	  in	  manipulating	  energy	  markets	  beyond	  what	  is	  known	  from	  the	  decision	  of	  Hughes	  v.	  
Talen.	  While	  the	  decision	  of	  this	  case	  would	  essentially	  determine	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  Future	  Energy	  Jobs	  Bill	  in	  Illinois,	  a	  similar	  discussion	  may	  be	  of	  interest	  if	  there	  is	  any	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  two	  rulings.	  Also	  of	  interest	  would	  be	  research	  into	  the	  progression,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  of	  nuclear	  subsidy	  programs	  in	  New	  Jersey,	  Ohio,	  and	  Pennsylvania,	  as	  well	  as	  programs	  in	  other	  states	  that	  have	  enacted	  them	  by	  the	  time	  of	  research.	  	  	  The	  cost	  estimate	  of	  the	  ZEC	  program	  is	  founded	  on	  projected	  future	  energy	  market	  conditions,	  which	  are	  highly	  unpredictable	  and	  influenced	  by	  numerous	  complex	  factors.	  After	  the	  program	  is	  finished	  an	  interesting	  topic	  to	  examine	  would	  be	  how	  accurate	  these	  initial	  estimates	  were,	  and	  what	  major	  trends	  or	  events	  created	  any	  discrepancy	  with	  the	  actual	  final	  cost.	  Additionally,	  this	  discussion	  could	  include	  an	  overview	  of	  New	  York’s	  performance	  in	  reaching	  its	  CES	  mandated	  emissions	  reduction	  targets,	  and	  how	  necessary	  nuclear	  energy	  was	  to	  reaching	  them	  after	  all.	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Appendix:	  List	  of	  Acronyms	  	  CCA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Community	  Choice	  Aggregation	  	  CCE	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Coalition	  for	  Competitive	  Energy	  CES	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Clean	  Energy	  Standard	  CPP	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Clean	  Power	  Plan	  CPV	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Competitive	  Power	  Ventures	  DOE	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Department	  of	  Energy	  EPA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  	  ESCO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Energy	  Service	  Company	  FERC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Federal	  Energy	  Regulatory	  Commission	  IPP	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Independent	  Power	  Producer	  ISO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Independent	  System	  Operator	  LSE	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Load-­‐‑Serving	  Entity	  MCP	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Market	  Clearing	  Price	  MDPSC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Maryland	  Public	  Service	  Commission	  NYDPS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  New	  York	  Department	  of	  Public	  Service	  NYPSC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  New	  York	  Public	  Service	  Commission	  PSL	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Public	  Service	  Law	  PX	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Power	  Exchange	  REC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Renewable	  Energy	  Credit	  RES	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Renewable	  Energy	  Standard	  REV	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Reforming	  the	  Energy	  Vision	  	  RTO	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Regional	  Transmission	  Organization	  RGGI	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Regional	  Greenhouse	  Gas	  Initiative	  ROS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Rest	  of	  State	  SCC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Social	  Cost	  of	  Carbon	  SEP	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  State	  Energy	  Plan	  ZEC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Zero	  Emission	  Credit	  
